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Abstract
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to argue that a particular ontological claim, which I
call the ‘sortal instantiation thesis’ (associated primarily with the work of David Wiggins),
has been overstated. On this view, each object is given a metaphysically privileged char-
acterisation, which references a kind of which it is an instance. Whilst I agree that such
characterisations are deeply caught up with the metaphysics of objects, I dispute the fur-
ther thought that an object must instantiate its characterising kind whenever it exists.
My ﬁrst chapter introduces the sortal instantiation thesis and notes that it is faced with
a particular challenge in accounting for identity through change (owing to the fact that
kind terms typically hold of an entity at or across particular times). Following this, the fol-
lowing two chapters present a counter-example to this claim. I plan to argue that (at least
some) animals do not cease to exist upon their deaths (instead they continue to exist as their
corpses). A corpse, however, does not fall under the kind ‘animal’; upon its death, an ani-
mal becomes liĴle more than a structured collection of organic tissues. Following this, the
fourth and ﬁnal chapter of my thesis modiﬁes the sortal instantiation thesis in light of this
counter-example. I shall suggest that we see a corpse as a type of metaphysical ‘remnant’,
whose continued existence depends upon a kind which it does not exemplify. The role that
kinds play in seĴling identity questions does not, therefore, require their exempliﬁcation,
as the sortal instantiation thesis suggests. Instead, I shall suggest, something much weaker
is involved in an entity’s being ‘characterised’ by a given sort.
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Cѕюѝѡђџ 1
The Sortal Instantiation Thesis
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to argue that a particular claim, which I shall label the ‘sor-
tal instantiation thesis’, has been overstated. This thesis is motivated by the (correct I feel)
thought that an account of the truth conditions of identity statements must make use of a cer-
tain, metaphysically privileged, characterisation of their objects. According to this Fregean-
cum-Aristotelian ontology, certain sorts play a central role in generating entities and, in virtue
of doing so, seĴle all facts about their identity. The overstatement of this thesis rests in the
claim that a single entity must always instantiate the sort which generates it. The aim of the
ﬁrst part of this chapter is to spell out this statement in a clear and general manner. Following
this, I shall detail why I take questions of continuity through change to put it under particular
pressure. With change, I shall claim, emerges the need to detail clearly what it takes for an ob-
ject to instantiate some property or other – a key consideration when one begins to examine
the sortal instantiation thesis. Whatever interpretation of this notion one chooses, a counter-
example to the sortal instantiation thesis can be found if an object might ever be individuated
by a sort under which it does not fall; in such a case, that object’s existence stems from its
connection to some kind of which it is not, at that time, an instance. Having suggested this
possibility, the remainder of this thesis aims to substantiate the claim that it does in fact oc-
cur and, further, to suggest how we should understand the idea that sorts play privileged
‘generative’ roles in light of this.
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1.1 Sorts and Generation
To begin our examination of the sortal instantiation thesis, we should look to the thought that
it is a precondition of the truth of any identity claim that the objects involved be subsumed
under a single kind. Its most extended and recent exposition is, of course, found in the work
of David Wiggins, from which we might consider the following statement:
Onewho knowswhat he is sayingwhen he says that ‘a = b’ ought to be in a position
to explain, where a and b are continuants, that a is a continuant which…and b is a
continuant which _ _ _, and then to expand each speciﬁcation separately in a way
suﬃcient to make it determinate (with the help of the world) which continuant a
is and which continuant b is. In the course of this being achieved, as a necessary
condition of the truth of the identity claim, some common sort f will have to be
found to which they each belong. (2001, p. 58)
Our interest in this claim shall be in its last element – the assertion that one must reference an
object’s kind in order to make it determinate which entity that thing is. To this end, I shall
begin by sketching the context within which it should be understood (making it clear that
Wiggins is neither making a point exclusively about continuants nor about the epistemology
of identity statements). Following this, I shall detail how, on the Wigginsian view, objects
might come into existence with identities already made determinate, drawing from this the
‘sortal instantiation thesis’. Subsequently, I shall conclude this section by contrasting our way
of approaching questions of ’generation’ with an alternative approach, of which DummeĴ
and Strawson’s views about feature-placing are exemplary.
1.1.1 Preliminaries
There are, I think, multiple distracting elements within the above quotation from which its
central claim should be disentangled. First, Wiggins explicitly restricts his aĴention here to
continuants and, in the course of presenting his views, states that the “special eﬀectiveness of
the [above suggestion] is that, in the case of continuants, it refers us back to our constantly exercised
idea of the persistence and life-span of an entity” (ibid, p. 61). As a result of this, onemight initially
12
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be inclined to think that the condition detailed above applies uniquely to the things which
have life-spans – of which concrete material substances are the most paradigmatic example.
Despite this, one should note that Wiggins explicitly states that one should apply the very
same thesis to numbers deployed in the context of counting objects, at least if one “subscribes
to the idea that numbers are objects” (ibid, p. 58). Although one need not deny that questions
of identity take on a particular signiﬁcance in the case of continuant objects (since one must
establish an object’s identity by relatively direct means before ascribing to it historical prop-
erties (2001, p. 57)) there is, as yet, liĴle reason to think that the above claim holds only when
one considers the identity of substances. Further, Wiggins, at more than one point, approv-
ingly references the similarities between his analysis of identity statements and Frege’s (see,
for example, ibid, p. 60). Frege’s concerns, however, were quite clearly with the identity of ab-
stract entities, such as numbers, across the variety of contexts into which they might be intro-
duced. Given that Wiggins identiﬁes a common concern across these variant subject maĴers,
we should, I think, consider him to be applying a fully general ontological thesis to the case
of continuant substances and showing how it might hold good even when one considers the
complications introduced by change, not just in the manner in which an entity is introduced
to us but also in the properties which it bears. Hence, despite the restriction of Wiggins’ at-
tention to continuants (a consequence of his intention to detail how “a notion of the exigency
that we ascribe to the identity relation can ﬁnd application in the changeable world of our experience”
(ibid, p. 3)), we should, I think, consider his suggestion to connect to a fully general thesis,
intended to apply not only to substances but also to non-continuants for which questions of
identity arise, including both particular events and processes and non-concrete entities such
as numbers, concepts and thoughts.
It is further necessary to distinguish our concerns from the epistemic strands of Wiggins’
thought. One of Wiggins’ chief concerns in Sameness and Substance Renewed is to elaborate
how thinkers might single out and think about individual objects. In this, Wiggins follows
Strawson in thinking that “in order for an identifying reference to a particular to be made, there
must be some true empirical proposition known […] to the eﬀect that there is just one particular which
answers to a certain description” (Strawson 1959, p. 183). Many descriptions, however, may
equally be uniquely true of a single entity, allowing us to unknowingly think of it under
13
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more than one guise. In such a scenario, one might question in what sense the thinker can be
considered to knowwhich object it is that she thinks of under each of these contrasting guises.
In light of this type of worry, we might understand the above quotation to suggest that a
thinkermust, in order to have a singular thought about any entity, characterise it in such away
that she could, in principle, explain how one might discover that it is (or is not) identical to
the bearer of any other deﬁnite description; something which in turn requires her to conceive
of it as a thing of some speciﬁc kind. Indeed, such considerations ultimately lead Wiggins to
assert that “the ﬁrst concern of the philosophy of any subject maĴer must be to enhance our powers
of ﬁnding the elucidation (whether or not we use here the language of criteria) for its disputed identity
questions” (2001, p. 61) – a focus which is apparent in many of his views, and in the arguments
provided in their favour. Despite this, there is, I suspect, a more general metaphysical point
to bemade here, which we shall draw out below. Here, I shall suggest, we should understand
Wiggins to suggest a perspective upon the conditions under which objects are generated and
distinguished from one another (and consequently upon the underpinnings of facts about
identity) which takes the kinds under which they fall to do key individuative work.
1.1.2 Generation
Whilst Wiggins’ views are couched deeply in awareness of our cognitive limitations, and of
the particular diﬃculties faced by those keeping track of objects which might change, we
might fruitfully apply his views when examining how it might be made metaphysically de-
terminate that some properties are (uniquely or not) instantiated by a single entity rather
than by several. This question ties naturally to our concerns with identity insofar as it seems
sensible to think that one may only ascribe properties to an entity whose identity is already
ﬁxed. Thus, our inquiry into the determination of an object’s properties will naturally lead us
towards an account of its identity. Further, I shall assume that any object’s existence should
be thought to be intimately connected with those of its features which determine precisely
which individual it is (i.e. which ‘ﬁx’ its identity). Therefore, I shall speak interchangeably of
‘generation’ and of the ‘ﬁxation’ of an object’s identity in what is to follow. It is important,
however, to note here that metaphysical ‘generation’ need not involve an object’s coming to
14
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be through the creative action of some other entity. Hence, when, for example, I speak of a
‘generative sort’, I do not mean to imply that sorts act in such a way as to cause anything to
come into existence but merely to suggest that any object’s identity is grounded in its mem-
bership of some kind (which must therefore be referenced in any account of its existence). It
is this position that I shall aĴempt to explicate in the remainder of this section, before ﬁnally
giving an explicit characterisation of the sortal instantiation thesis.
When asked what it takes for some properties to be coinstantiated, the simplest answer
is, I think, the best one; two properties are coinstantiated when they are borne by one and
the same entity. It is in spelling out what it takes for this to be the case that we run into
philosophical diﬃculties. Tomodel our predicament, wemight imagine ourselves facedwith
a range of open sentences (whichmay or may not contain repeated instances of any predicate
or collection thereof, even to the point of diﬀering only in the variable allocated to them), each
predicating something of an entity represented by some unbound variable:
F1x1 F2x2 … Fn−1xn−1 Fnxn
Each of these statements says that some object xi bears some property Fi. Unless, however, it
is seĴled which variables stand for the same entity, this does not yet give us the answers to
every identity questionwhichwemight ask; we cannot, for example, knowwhether F2 is true
of the entity associated with x1. Hence, although these predications might inform us about
some entities, they fail to properly introduce them into our domain of quantiﬁcation and,
consequently, provide us with liĴle insight into its cardinality; at most, the above tells us only
that we do not havemore than n objects in this domain. To remedy this, wemust associate the
entities which populate our discourse with additional information in such a way that their
identities are ﬁxed. In what follows, we must therefore ask how we might introduce entities
into a domain of quantiﬁcation in such a way as to make sense of the constraints which we
intuitively recognise upon its population.
To ﬁx the cardinality of our domain of quantiﬁcation, one might here be tempted simply
to stipulate the extension of the identity predicate, stating that ‘x1 =x2’ should be taken to
be a true sentence, and so that F1 and F2 are instantiated by a single entity. In doing so, one
eﬀectively constructs a series of entities whose identities are ﬁxed in a primitive manner, in-
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dependently of their instantiation of any properties. Metaphysically speaking, this picture
is somewhat unappealing. It is, I think, diﬃcult to draw from this view an understanding
of why certain properties cannot together be true of a single subject at one time (e.g. why
we should not identify the thing with the property of being my cat with the thing which
possesses the property of being my mother); this strategy hence leaves us with no resources
(save the exclusion of logically contradictory qualities) by which to disqualify the stipulation
that the variables involved in seemingly incompatible predications are associated with one
and the same individual. Equally, it is not easy to see why we must take certain collections
of properties to be associated with only one entity, rather than with several – it is not, for
example, immediately evident why we could not ascribe the softness of my curtains to one
entity, and their colour to another co-located with it. Indeed, even if no two entities could
possess exactly the same collection of properties (a result of the identity of indiscernibles –
plausibly an unavoidable constraint upon our interpretation of objects’ identities), it might
yet be questionedwhywe cannot take any object to be associatedwith a number of alternative
individuals, each of which bears only a proper subset of the properties which that thing has
(e.g. one sub-curtain has no colour, but all the same physical properties as does the curtain
in my room). Hence, not only does this picture enter few constraints upon the population of
any domain of quantiﬁcation with individual entities (and so do very liĴle to determine its
cardinality), it is further diﬃcult to see what restrictions it places upon the introduction of
property ascriptions into the series of open sentences fromwhich entities are to be generated,
and so how it might stave oﬀ their proliferation beyond necessity.
We should hence conclude that the above strategy gives liĴle rationale for the restrictions
which we usually recognise upon the properties which some entity might simultaneously
bear or, similarly, for the exclusion relations we think to hold between entities (such as, for
example, the principle that only one entity of a single kind might ﬁt in one region of space).
These ordinarily function to constrain our introduction of entities into a domain of discourse
and consequently play a vital role in ﬁxing its cardinality – determining upper and lower
bounds for the number of entities whichwemay there recognise.1 Onemay, of course, simply
1I do not mean here to suggest that we must, in order to ﬁx the identities of the particular objects in any domain
of quantiﬁcation, elaborate an entirely general method for enumerating them; as Wiggins notes (2001, pp. 74–75),
16
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respond to this challenge by postulating the existence of brute (nomologically or metaphysi-
cally necessary) constraints upon the population of a domain of discourse with entities. It is,
however, possible to do more than this if we instead take each object’s identity to be ﬁxed by
a characterisation with which it is intimately (and uniquely) connected. It is, I should suggest,
this strategy which ultimately leads us to the sortal instantiation thesis.
With this in mind, we should now note the artiﬁciality of the above framework for think-
ing about identity and predication (and, upon this basis, reject it in favour of an alternative
which beĴer accommodates the constraints mentioned above). We have above imagined that
a range of properties might be determinately ascribed to some entities whilst it is not yet
made clear to which entity each property is ascribed (since an object’s identity must be ﬁxed
independently of the ascription of properties to it). It is, I think, natural to demand instead
that each property ascription not only tell us that some entity has a particular property but
also detail more exactly which entity it is which has that property. In eﬀect, this amounts
to the requirement to ﬁnd a metaphysically ﬁrm basis upon which to ‘hook’ singular prop-
erty ascriptions. The approach that I should recommend again mirrors Strawson’s views of
the operation of property ascriptions in speech. Just as to knowingly ascribe a property to
some entity, one must have access to some description which that object uniquely satisﬁes,
we might ﬁx the form of our property ascriptions as follows:
F1[the cat on the bed], F2[the third natural number] … Fn[the cat on the bed]
The general formof this solution, relies uponus to introduce each entity into a property ascrip-
tion using some descriptionwhich it is guaranteed to uniquely satisfy.2 In ordinary discourse,
any such piece of information will suﬃce, provided only that one might reasonably (and cor-
rectly) believe that it is uniquely satisﬁed by the object of thought. In contrast, it is, I think, not
implausible to insist that some descriptions are metaphysically privileged. Not only are these
there may, consistently with the above, be circumstances in which the mechanisms which ﬁx objects’ identities do
not determine how many distinct entities are to be found in that domain. Rather, I mean only to point out that
there ordinarily seem to be fairly rigid constraints upon the cardinality of any domain of quantiﬁcation (stemming
from constraints upon its population with individuals) which cannot be explained if we simply generate entities by
stipulating their identities across a range of property ascriptions.
2As a potential counter-example, one might imagine sentences which involve a type-token ambiguity. Here,
we typically take a meaningful proposition to have been uĴered when it makes liĴle diﬀerence to the statement’s
signiﬁcance how one resolves the ambiguity. To this, I shall simply reply that such a sentence, unlike the predications
with which we are concerned, does not achieve singular reference until the ambiguity is resolved. Thus, I set it aside
for now.
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descriptions uniquely satisﬁed by the entities involved, they also play a particular role in the
generation of their aĴendant particulars (since it is ultimately the properties referenced in
such descriptions which individuate these objects). For example, although my cat is the only
pet that I do not share with my sister, this description does not, metaphysically speaking, ﬁx
his identity; it is completely irrelevant to his existence as the very cat which he is. Thus, to
return to the original question which engaged us, we might propose the following principle:
Characterisation: Any object is associated with some metaphysically privileged set of prop-
erties which it is guaranteed to uniquely satisfy.3 These properties ﬁx its identity (and,
as such, might be said to be responsible for its existence).
Once we have a principle such as the above in place, it is easy to populate any domain of
quantiﬁcation with entities and to make it determinate which properties each object bears.
Consequently, we might easily, by spelling out the diﬀerent ways in which individual ob-
jects might be uniquely characterised (and hence introduced into existence with the facts
about their identities already made determinate), make sense of the constraints which we
intuitively recognise upon the cardinality of any particular domain of discourse. With this
in mind, we ought now to ask ourselves how objects might be generated in this particular
manner. The answer to this will, I think, also allow us to explain why certain properties (or
types of property) are always found co-instantiated, whilst others never are (for example, it
is impossible for my cat to be prime, odd or even). What we might say, following Aristo-
tle is that each entity is introduced into existence under some particular kind. This kind has
3It is important to note that the ‘guarantee’ involved in this solution need not be so strong as to entail that no two
objects could have the same properties (provided they had those properties at diﬀerent times or in diﬀerent possible
worlds) or that no object could ever be characterised by diﬀerent properties than those which now individuate it.
Rather, I mean only to highlight that some properties, key among which (one might think) is a physical object’s
spatial location, must be referenced in any account of the particular manner in which it (at any time) exempliﬁes its
kind. Of course, one here runs into diﬃculties concerning the ontology of spatial locations, which one might think
to be abstractions from objects’ relative positioning (within a given frame of reference) and so to be ontologically
posterior, rather than prior, to individual entities. If two objects could, in every respect besides their spatial locations,
be qualitative duplicates of one another, how can one then hold that each object has a unique characterisation? The
answer to this rests, of course, in the idea that so soon as one has a single material object, one might proceed to
individuate a number of spatial locations without waiting for another entity to come onto the scene (such as, for
example, the sum of points which lie between its surface and halfway into its exterior). Thus, we shall say that the
sphere’s existence alone, rather than extrinsic facts concerning its relations to other objects, suﬃces for us to begin
individuating regions of space. Once this is made clear, I see liĴle reason why such ‘dependent’ entities cannot
be referenced in order to capture how it is that an object exempliﬁes its kind in a unique manner – indeed, every
other property referenced in an object’s characterisation is in some sense equally only available to do individuative
work because of its prior connection with the object, thus calling into question the view that spatial properties are
particularly tricky features by which to individuate objects.
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associated with it a particular deﬁnition, which details a number of properties by which its
members are to be characterised (e.g. a set is uniquely individuated by its members whilst a
number might be individuated by its position in the number line, or, equivalently, by its re-
lationship to the other numbers). These deﬁning properties can typically be instantiated in a
number of diﬀerent ways and it is their particular implementation which distinguishes each
entity of a single kind from every other entity of that kind. This at once explains why one
tends to ﬁnd particular conﬁgurations of properties coinstantiated in nature and also why it
should seem so absurd to think that the shape of what seems to us to be a single mathemati-
cal ﬁgure should be associated with one entity whilst the length of its sides is associated with
another (or that the colour of my curtains should similarly be borne by something distinct
from the entity which bears their weight); these qualities, one might say, proceed from an
entity’s deﬁning characterisation (or could only accrue to an entity which had some elements
of that characterisation). Aristotle, of course, expands upon this ontological perspective by
stating that an object’s form ‘carves up’ undiﬀerentiated ‘prime maĴer’ which, in turn, distin-
guishes it from everything else by providing a basis for its other properties (indeed, on later
scholastic understandings of Aristotle, it is the object’s maĴer itself which provides it with
many of the properties which diﬀerentiate it from other members of its kind). We, in contrast,
typically think that an object possesses many of its properties in virtue of its micro-chemical
structure – a thesis which justiﬁes the thought that no two objects of the same kind could, at
one time, have the very same constituent parts (since they would then implement their kind
in the same manner and so, by the thesis we have put forwards, be one and the same individ-
ual).4 Alternatively, one might individuate objects by reference to their spatial locations, and
thus block instead the thought that two objects of the same kind might co-locate. In each of
these cases, one characterises objects by reference to a number of parameters relevant to the
implementation of their kinds, seĴing each entity apart as the sole object to (at any time at
which it exists) take the values which it does for the parameters identiﬁed. From this, we get
the following elaboration of the thesis which is the topic of our discussion:
4Throughout this thesis, I aim to remain neutral about the claim that objects of diﬀerent kinds might sometimes
spatially coincide – nothing of note here hangs upon its acceptance or rejection.
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Sortal Instantiation: Each entity’s existence depends upon its implementation of somekind,5
which gives its (fundamental) characterisation and, in doing so, reveals which addi-
tional properties set it apart from all other things.
The sortal instantiation thesis hence insists that we individuate an object simply by question-
ing how it implements its particular kind. There are, I think, a number of reasons to think
that this is a sensible thesis. Primary among these is an incipient distinction in the way that
we ordinarily think and speak between what an entity is and what it is like. It seems incred-
ibly natural to think that some predicates play a more fundamental role in detailing what
an entity is than do others; these characterise, one might naturally say, its ‘identity’ whilst
the remainder simply detail diﬀerent ways that the thing is. On our interpretation, we might
think that the more important properties are those which are most intimately linked to its
characterisation as an object of some particular kind (i.e. one might think that these charac-
teristics explain, or describe, the particular manner in which it implements its kind). Thus,
for example, an individual curtain is an extended physical object made of a certain kind of
cloth, which possesses a certain shape (this being how it implements many of its physical
properties). In contrast, its physical disposition, although only a liĴle easier to change than
its shape, simply features as a way that that thing is – it is, we might think, not directly in-
volved in its implementation of its kind. Rather than delay longer explicating this distinction,
I shall brieﬂy canvass an alternative, and perhaps easier, way to think ourselves into the sor-
tal instantiation thesis and detail my reasons for steering clear of in the above discussion.
Following this, I shall, in the next section of this chapter, explain why I take the possibility of
an object’s changing its properties as time passes to provide a particularly interesting context
within which to test the sortal instantiation thesis. The fact that an object need not always
exemplify the kind most centrally involved in its individuation, I suggest, shows that we do
not individuate objects by so coarse a method as equating them with the implementation of
their kinds; rather, we must say that an object’s characterisation may, if it references some
5At this point in our discussion, I do not wish to associate any particular metaphysical baggage with the notion
of a ‘kind’ or a ‘sort’. It is, for example, perfectly consistent with what I shall say here that the identities of material
substances are simply set by their propensities to move as a whole in the face of outside inﬂuence (see, for example,
Xu 1997 for a psychological argument which might be taken to suggest that such features are central to the identities
of material substances).
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kind, permit the object to exist without being an instance of that particular kind.
1.1.3 Feature-placing and Qualitative Holism
We have above seen the need for an explanation of the determinacy with which properties
might be aĴached to individuals. This led us towards an Aristotelian ontology, under which
individual objects are equated with particular instantiations of their kinds. To be an individ-
ual, on this account, is simply to manifest one’s generative kind in a unique manner – a claim
which is implicit in Wiggins’ suggestion that knowledge of an object’s kind must be factored
into our understanding of its identity. One might complain that I have above said very liĴle
about how entities are generated, or why the world permits their generation. Once this ques-
tion arises, one might think back to a view which some have read into WiĴgenstein’s claim
that the world is “the totality of facts, not of things” (1961, 1.1), suggesting that the individua-
tion of objects takes place against the background of a more fundamental picture of reality
as a type of qualitative mosaic of objectless facts. In the remainder of this section of our dis-
cussion, I wish to brieﬂy elaborate upon this alternative framework within which the sortal
instantiation thesis could be introduced and subsequently to brieﬂy outline my reasons for
avoiding this in the above.
As I take it, the view under discussion states that there is nothing particularly ‘meaty’
about individual objects; they are not the fundamental constituents of the world, to be gen-
erated ex nihilo and then to bear properties. Rather, fundamentally, the world is made up
of a mosaic of properties and relations, glued together to make facts (from which objects are
abstractions, invented so that we might represent particularly rigid connections and paĴerns
of instantiation of such qualities, such as that which ties the colour of my curtains to their
solidity). The world is, to use DummeĴ’s memorable turn of phrase, an ‘amorphous lump’
(see pp. 563–573 of his 1973 for more detail on how DummeĴ takes this picture to interact
with an ontology of particular things), within which we might ﬁnd objects in a variety of
ways, depending on our particular interests.6 Here, the question of generation raised above
6For a less picturesque presentation of this idea, one might look to Dasgupta’s 2009, 2011 and 2015. On Das-
gupta’s view, reality ultimately consists of the occurrence of a single, complicated quality (detailing the total state
of the world), expressed by reference to a number of functors associated with all the properties which we think are
exempliﬁed, permuted in such a way as to make sense of their relations of co-instantiation. It is extremely diﬃcult
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is explicitly cognitive, asking how one could ﬁnd and single out entities in such a world, and
determine which properties they have (hence representing the more fundamental spread of
qualities across reality).
In response to this puzzle, one might look to Strawson’s discussion of ‘feature-placing’
languages (1959, pp. 202–209).7 Eﬀectively, Strawson states that the distinction between a
language of individuals and one which only describes the distribution of certain qualities in
space lies in the determination of what is to count as being confronted with a single individ-
ual across a number of diﬀerent contexts. This proceeds from the subsumption of a region
of space which displays a certain characteristic paĴern under a single sortal term character-
ising the entity which occupies that space (and consequently ﬁxing its identity). Strawson’s
discussion is necessarily abbreviated and, as such, he does not discuss the possibility of two
entities sharing the same spatial location and yet having diﬀerent characterisations. SeĴing
this aside, wemight focus here upon the thought that wemight ﬁnd somemaster property, or
feature uponwhich to hang the existence of an entity (whichmight, through its application to
that object, set its spatial boundaries and determine what it is to be faced with the very same
entity on a number of occasions). This has a similar character to the sortal instantiation thesis
as elaborated above; in each case, we hang the existence of individuals upon their exempliﬁ-
cation of some characteristic qualities. It is this which subsequently allows us to distinguish
their properties from those which should instead be ascribed to other entities. In light of this,
it maĴers liĴle for the concerns voiced later in this thesis which of these frameworks one
adopts; in either case, one will ﬁnd a solid basis for the claim which I wish to unseat in what
follows.
The sole diﬀerence, I take it, between our presentation and the alternative given here lies
in the laĴer’s insistence that we may be confronted with individual property instances with-
out yet thinking of individual substances. Although this alternative framework avoids the
to understand the semantics of this system without referring back to a ﬁxed range of individuals, a point which
Dasgupta concedes, although he takes it to derive from the fact that we are naturally inclined to think of individual
objects for reasons of cognitive eﬃciency. Nevertheless, we might take the thought to be that there is a single distri-
bution of properties around a number of ‘nodes’, which do not themselves bear properties but which map out the
qualitative distribution of properties in reality, just as might a grid overlaid onto a painting.
7To tie my discussion above to Strawson’s, we might state that I have above concerned myself only with the
conditions for the introduction1 of entities into reality (i.e. the generation of particular entities, which may happily
be, to some extent, interdependent). Bymoving to the idea of a qualitative mosaic, one questions also how onemight
introduce2 substances into a (more primitive) description of the world.
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artiﬁciality of asking how one might tie down a series of predications to one object rather
than another, I have avoided it for two reasons. First and foremost, I have aĴempted through-
out the above to illustrate how the sortal instantiation thesis presupposes nothing unique to
continuants and instead applies systematically to abstract as well as to concrete entities. It
is, however, questionable whether the existence of abstract entities, such as numbers, can be
understood to stem from the prior distribution of a number of properties across mathemat-
ical reality. Further, I am sympathetic to the view that there is something entirely primitive
and irreducible about the frame of thought within which we introduce particulars into our
discourse. Regarding reductive programs, which aĴempt to ﬁnd within a scientist’s view of
the universe the materials upon which to ground the existence of concrete entities, Wiggins
says “in practice, it seems almost impossible to ﬁnd again in the new framework either the things
or the properties that our philosophical and everyday concerns and questions involve us with” (2001,
p. 182), a claim with which I am inclined to agree. Thus, rather than presupposing the prior
existence of anything (from which we might then generate individual entities), I have here
proceeded as though individual objects are the most fundamental existents, relying upon no
prior materials for their existence. I have aĴempted to show that, even on this radical picture,
it is possible to give a theory of objectswhich systematically explains how it is that the identity
of any entity is determinately ﬁxed and how this might constrain the properties which it may
bear. With this covered, we might now turn to consider why the sortal instantiation thesis
faces its greatest challenge in the context of questions about an object’s persistence through
change.
1.2 Change, Persistence and Sortal Predication
I have been careful to proceed above without reference to the ways objects might be at diﬀer-
ent times, or to the idea that they might change. This has, I hope, allowed me to give an ab-
stract characterisation of the position under examination in this thesiswithout bringing in any
of the complications or provisos which one encounters the moment one questions how one
and the same object might bear diﬀerent (even incompatible) properties at diﬀerent points
of its existence. It is now time to expose ourselves to these diﬃculties as they will, I hope, re-
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veal most clearly what I take to be wrong about the sortal instantiation thesis (namely that it
connects objects too intimately with their implementation of the sorts which generate them).
In the following two chapters, my aim is to argue that the entities generated by a particular
kind (labelled here юћіњюљ) need not, whenever they exist, fall under that sort. Following this,
the ﬁnal chapter of this thesis will draw together the implications of this challenge, suggest-
ing the importance of accepting something more subtle than the sortal instantiation thesis, at
least in our treatment of concrete material continuants. First, however, I shall explain why I
take the possibility of change to throw up a special set of issues.
1.2.1 The Temporal Structure of Sortal Predication
The sortal instantiation thesis states that each object exists in virtue of its implementation of
some particular kind. It is easy to see how this thesis applies to certain kinds of abstract ob-
jects, such as numbers, whose properties (for the most part) are held neither at nor relative to
individual times and places.8 An object may be held up as an instance of any property which
it bears in this atemporal and aspatial manner; the number 2, for example, is not only an in-
stance of a number but also, one might say, of evenness and of primeness. In what follows, I
wish brieﬂy to outline how complexities in the structure of spatial and temporal predication,
absent from (most of) the properties by which we standardly characterise non-concrete ob-
jects, begin to raise diﬃculties for the sortal instantiation thesis, spelling out schematically the
type of counter-example to this thesis which I aim to present in the following two chapters.
The case of predicates which hold of their objects atemporally and aspatially is naturally
contrasted with more ordinary properties, such as ‘is red’ and ‘is curved’. Such properties
might fail to hold true of an object everywhere that it is located (being borne by some of its
parts but not by others), or be exempliﬁed by that object at some times but not at others. Al-
though this observation famously led Lewis to claim that objects have temporal parts (Lewis
8It is potentially important to note that there are two ways in which one might interpret the idea that spatial and
temporal considerations are relevant to the evaluation of any predicative statement. First, onemight hold that objects
bear some of their properties relative to individual times, thus stating that some property ascriptions should be
understood to have additional arguments (often suppressed in every day speech)which relativise them to individual
times and places. Alternatively, it is possible instead to state that no such sensitivity is encoded in the content of any
predictive statement but rather that its truth value might change at diﬀerent times (or relative to diﬀerent points in
space). For the purposes of this thesis, it maĴers not which of these views of the grammar of predicative statements
one adopts.
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1986, pp. 202–205), I shall not here presuppose that it places one under any pressure to ac-
cept such ‘four-dimensionalist’ views. Indeed, nothing which is to come in this section of our
thesis requires one even to accept that objects are composed from parts located in space; it
is, in principle, possible to parse each of the key points to come whilst speaking only of an
object’s temporal and spatial extent. Nevertheless, it is, I think, important to pay careful at-
tention to the diﬀerent predications in which objects might be engaged when looking into
the connection between an object’s existence and its implementation of the kind which indi-
viduates it. SeĴing aside questions of composition, such predications draw our aĴention to
complexities in the manner in which one might interpret the sortal instantiation thesis, and
so, I shall suggest, reveal how it might be proven false.
To begin our investigation, we should note that it is somewhat unnatural to hold up an
object as an instance of a property which it exempliﬁes at some but not all of the places that
it is located; a red and white barber pole, for example, whilst it is closely associated with an
instance of redness (the loop which wraps around it), cannot accurately be described as itself
an instance of redness – at best, it may be thought to be an instance of redness at some points
but not at others. If we are to make this a point of metaphysics, rather than simply one of
pragmatics, and to understand an object’s temporal extent in much the same way as we do
its spatial extent, then thiswould justify us in thinking that the sortal instantiation thesis states
that every object must implement a single characterising kind at every moment at which it
exists (as it would not otherwise be possible to claim that the object’s existence is grounded in
its implementation of that kind). Although I shall not rule out this interpretation of the notion
of an ‘instance’ in this thesis, it is, I think, intuitive to believe that there exists a great diﬀerence
between temporal and spatial predication (mirrored in the fact that almost all sentences have
tense, whilst very few are indexed to particular locations). Hence, we might instead consider
an object to be an instance of a property at any time just in case it, at that time, exempliﬁes
that property. The sortal instantiation thesis, on this interpretation, says not that every object
should always implement some particular kind, but rather that any objectmust, at any time at
which it exists, implement some characterising kind or other. It is, I think, easy to be sceptical
of this suggestion’s ability to make sense of an object’s persistence through time (for more
on this worry, see Wiggins 2001, pp. 64–68). Nevertheless, I shall set such worries aside for
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now. Instead, I shall simply note that both of these interpretations of the sortal instantiation
thesis have the consequence that an object must, at any time at which it exists, exemplify the
sort which characterises it (at that moment in time). It is this claim which I shall take on in
the following two chapters, arguing that corpses may be individuated by a kind under which
they no longer fall. Before outlining the strategy to come, it is worth, however, looking also to
an alternative account of the structure of sortal predication which holds that objects belong to
kinds at particular points in time only in virtue of ﬁrst belonging to those kinds across some
period of time.
I have above elaborated the ontological consequences of two diﬀerent ways in which we
might understand an object to be an instance of a property which holds of it at particular mo-
ments in time. It is, further, worth canvassing the alternative suggestion that sortal predicates
are most fundamentally ascribed to objects across stretches of time, and not at each moment
at which they exist (such ascriptions being parasitic upon the wider ascription to the object of
some property which is true of it across its temporal extent –much as we can say of an area of
space covered by a single red thread that it contains a piece of tartan cloth only because of that
thread’s integration with the material surrounding it).9 This might be thought to suggest that
an object’s kind is fundamentally determined by the overall character of its career and not
by the features which it bears at particular moments in time – consequently threatening our
claim to disprove the sortal instantiation thesis by ﬁnding some properties, closely associated
with an object’s characterising sort, which it lacks at some point in its existence. Nevertheless,
even this diﬀerent picture of the temporal structure of property ascription feeds into a read-
ing of the sortal instantiation thesis which is incompatible with what I shall argue below. I
shall suggest that animals are individuated, at every time at which they exist, by a kindwhich
applies to them (at any time) only in virtue of their undertakings across particular portions of
their careers. To put the pointmore plainly, I shall argue that animalsmust be individuated by
reference to a speciﬁc type of activity. This activity, however, is not continued or developed
after an object’s death (even though it must continue to be referenced in order to individuate
9It is, I think, this view of kind-terms which underwrites David Wiggins’ suggestion that “the criterion for being a
horse is essentially dispositional and diachronic” and so that “not everything that looks for a moment or behaves for a moment as
if it were a horse is a horse” (2001, p. 178; see also ibid, pp. 71–72). Similarly, see Steward’s recent 2015 for the suggestion
as to how the recognition of predicates such as these might be thought to have important ontological consequences.
26
1.3. Summary
an organism’s corpse. Hence even if one might invent a predicate which animals implement
both whilst they are alive and after their deaths, our understanding of this predicate (and of
its application to a dead organism) will be wholly derived from a more fundamental account
of the individuation of living organisms – thus justifying the thought that it is the kind юћі-
њюљ, rather than this derived predicate (true across the whole of its subjects’ careers), which
individuates their corpses. Given this, we should say that the sort which fundamentally char-
acterises organisms, dead or alive, might hold of them only while they are alive, rather than
across the totality of their careers. Consequently, we cannot, as the sortal instantiation thesis
suggests, take each object’s existence to stem from its implementation of its characterising
sortal; an object might exist without being an instance of this sortal at all.
To conclude, our key point of interest rests in the thought that in order for a predicate to
characterise an object, it must (by itself) determine that a single object is involved all the cir-
cumstances inwhich that entitymay be (determinately) identiﬁed. If each object’s existence is,
as the sortal instantiation thesis insists, to stem from its implementation of some sortal predi-
cate, we should expect to be able to ascribe that predicate to the object whenever it exists (even
if we are only able to do so in virtue of its exempliﬁcation across a longer period of time). It is
this idea which I shall take on in this thesis, claiming that objects might exist without falling
under sorts which remain (without the need for supplementary materials) perfectly able to
characterise them. Such entities are, I shall suggest, individuated by reference to activities in
which they are no longer able to engage. Hence, careful aĴention to the temporal structure of
sortal predication shall reveal clearly that there is room to individuate entities by reference
to sorts which they do not instantiate, and hence to reject the sortal instantiation thesis.
1.3 Summary
I have above suggested that we must individuate objects by reference to a privileged charac-
terisation of the kind of thing which they are. Since, however, objects frequently implement
their sorts in diﬀerent ways as they undergo change, it is not entirely clear what we should
count as a single instance of any given predicate. This already weakens the claim, associated
with the sortal instantiation thesis, that we might individuate objects simply by reference
27
₁. Tѕђ Sќџѡюљ IћѠѡюћѡіюѡіќћ TѕђѠіѠ
to their instantiation of their kinds; to cope with change, the sortal instantiation thesis asks
that we avail ourselves of additional criteria for determining under what conditions we may
consider an object to be an instance of a property. I have above suggested that, however we
interpret the temporal structure of sortal predication, it is not possible for an object to be
characterisable as an instance of a kind which it does not, at the time of characterisation, im-
plement. Inwhat follows, I hope to decisively falsify the sortal instantiation thesis by showing
that objects might sometimes be individuated by reference to kinds to which they do not be-
long. I shall argue that the higher animals are individuated by sorts which they need not,
at every time at which they exist (in particular, the moments after their deaths), instantiate.
Thus, I argue, we ought to distinguish the implementation of some sortal predicate from the
rolewhich itmay take in characterising, and hence individuating, an object – thereby rejecting
the sortal instantiation thesis.
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The Life of an Organism
In this, the second chapter of my thesis, I aim to argue that no individuating sortal concept is
exempliﬁed by an organism both whilst it is alive and after its death. This chapter is divided
into two parts. First, I show that we must, in order to link together the various stages of an
organism’s life, rely upon a sortal conceptwhich gives special importance to the life processes
which characterise living organisms. To do so, I begin by presenting some problems for the
idea that we might characterise and track animals without recourse to their biological activi-
ties. Such an approach, I suggest, fails to properly explain the ontological signiﬁcance of the
considerations upon which it takes an organism’s existence to depend. Even if an organism’s
compositional features play a crucial role in its individuation, they do this, I conclude, only in
virtue of their connection to its biological activity. Hence, an organism’s life remains central
to its characterisation as the thing which it is. Having done this, I argue that a corpse is not
simply a bad exemplar of its kind (failing to display featureswhich are characteristic of its con-
speciﬁcs) but that it, in fact, completely fails to instantiate the kind associated with the living
thing which it once was; a dead organism is, I argue, too unlike a living animal to be thought
an instance of the kind which it exempliﬁed whilst it was alive. Thus, I conclude, there is no
individuative sort which is instantiated throughout both the career of a living entity and that
of its corpse.
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2.1 Biological Individuality
At ﬁrst sight, organisms seem to feature in both our everyday, folk-theoretic picture of the
world (not only do we farm, hunt and protect ourselves from organisms of diﬀerent kinds,
it also seems intuitive to think that we are ourselves such things) and the ontologies of the
life sciences (our ecological, physiological and evolutionary theories, for example, seem to
quantify over organisms and populations thereof). Organisms are, we ordinarily think, a dis-
tinctive kind of continuant, endowed with capacities for sensation and for purposive action.
Such things, one might suggest, display a level of internal complexity and organisation un-
paralleled by any other natural object. Indeed, because of this, Aristotle (and many of his fol-
lowers) took organisms to be the paradigm substances, after whose model one’s ontological
views should be developed. Nevertheless, philosophers of biology have, in the last century,
approached this aspect of our folk biology with some scepticism, even suggesting that organ-
isms play no essential role in the biological sciences.1 Whilst such a perspective is liable to
seem unnecessarily revisionary, I should, given its broad inﬂuence, brieﬂy explain how the
discussion to follow shall steer clear of such worries. By doing this, I hope to show that I am
not illegitimately helping myself to a folk-theoretical concept of no real ontological standing.
One source of scepticism about the organism concept stems from the sheer scope of bi-
ological inquiry. One need not stray very far from the range of supposedly paradigmatic
organisms (individual trees, animals and unicellular organisms) to happen upon a variety of
objects which are much more diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate from one another. Thus, for example,
one might ask whether a mushroom cluster, or an aspen grove, is a single entity or merely a
tight-knit community of organisms. Whilst such cases involve a number of separate complex
above-ground structures (each able to survive apart from its peers), these structures are con-
nected to one another by a single underlying root system. Similarly, slime moulds, despite
displaying a rudimentary form of coordination and cellular diﬀerentiation, are formedwhen,
1Thus, for example, Dawkins famously argued that genes are the primary units of natural selection whilst or-
ganisms are merely vehicles which carry those genes through their evolutionary trajectory (1976). Similarly, one
might think that ‘ﬁtness’ is properly ascribed to genotypes or to populations of like organisms. Additionally, it has
been questioned whether there are multiple ‘organism concepts’ with diﬀering extensions and whether, in the ﬁnal
analysis, the life sciences turn out not to need any conception of the individual organism in order to do their work.
Useful summaries of the treatment of the organism in the philosophy of biology might be found in Clarke (2011);
Clarke and Okasha (2013); Nicholson (2014) and Wilson (1999; 2000).
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due to adverse local conditions, a number of individual amoebas cluster together and, later,
compete to form the mould’s reproductive clusters. How could one determine whether these
things are true individuals or merely aggregations of cells? Against the sheer range of exam-
ples with which biologists must concern themselves, it seems very likely that no unequivocal
answer can here be given – a conclusion with surprising, and far reaching metaphysical im-
plications.
My hope, in what is to follow, is to steer clear of such diﬃcult questions, and their at-
tendant worries. To do so, I restrict my focus to more paradigmatic cases of biological indi-
viduality – the various members of the animal kingdom. There are, I suspect, few diﬃculties
associated with treating these things as individual substances. In support of this, one should
note that animals (at least typically) interactwith their environment in a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
manner than do (for example) plants. The fact that they do not produce their own sustenance
has required them to develop incredibly complex sensory, locomotive and digestive systems
(hence Aristotle’s claim that animals do not simply have the nutritive soul shared by all living
things but also, further, have a sensory soul). In virtue of this, one might take the activities
of their parts to be much more tightly integrated (and thus interdependent) than those of the
entities whose individuality has been called into question by philosophers of biology. To this
extent, there is reason not to worry about borderline cases of biological individuality as we
proceed here. Moreover, because of this greater level of integration, it seems clear to me that
we have no choice but to count these paradigmatic organisms as individual things, raising
questions about how they are diﬀerentiated from one another (and hence about the sort un-
der which they fall) which cannot be dismissed on account of the diﬃculties encountered by
those looking for a more general perspective upon biological individuality. I thus takemyself
to be on safe ground in looking for an individuative sort which applies to animals without
considering its impact upon broader debates in the philosophy of biology.
Given the above, it would not be surprising if animals were to display signiﬁcant meta-
physical diﬀerences from other living entities, legitimising their treatment as beings of diﬀer-
ent kinds. Indeed, this seems altogether plausible if one considers that multicellularity has
evolved separately at many points in earth’s history, at each point associating itself with very
diﬀerent survival and organisational strategies. Hence, I take myself to be justiﬁed in consid-
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ering only ‘ordinary’ biological individuals inwhat follows. To reﬂect this, I shall here use the
sortal term юћіњюљ to label the members of the restricted set of entities with which I am here
interested, leaving it open whether or not this metaphysical kind comprises entities outside
of the animal kingdom (and, indeed whether all members of the animal kingdom fall under
this kind).2
2.2 Animals and their Lives
There is a surprising lack of argument for the (frequentlymade) claim that life is central to the
individuation of animals. One route to this thesis derives from the sparse ontological views
of van Inwagen, according to which a plurality of things (such as the atoms which together
form a living body) can only compose a further object if they are caught up in a life – “a self-
maintaining, well-individuated, jealous event” (1990, p. 121). Upon this view, it is quite easy to
see that юћіњюљ can only apply to, and hence individuate, living organisms (since such things
are the only composite individuals). Since I shall shortly argue that organisms do continue
to exist after their deaths, my argument here must not rest upon such revisionary ontological
views. Nevertheless, I hope here to detail why we should understand life to play a role in the
individuation of animate organisms. Following this, I shall further argue that the importance
of life is such that we cannot consider a corpse to simply be a poor exemplar of animality.
A beĴer reason to think that life plays a central role in the individuation of living organ-
isms is, of course, the thought, central to much of what is to come, that many of an organism’s
features stem from the generative kind to which it belongs. Our enduring interest in animals
stems primarily from their biological activities and capacities for purposeful action. Since
such capacities are so widespread among animals, it seems reasonable to count them among
the features characteristic of their kinds. These capacities, however, are deeply dependent
upon an animal’s life processes, suggesting in turn that life is particularly central to animal-
ity. In place of adding further detail to this argument, I shall here present two cases against
2A further questionwhich shall have to be set aside here iswhether these entities all fall under a single generative
sort. My temptation here is to think that, insofar as we wish to uphold the view that an object’s kind endows it with
a particular mode of activity and natural developmental path, we shall eventually have to recognise юћіњюљ to be
a genus under which many objects, each generated by a diﬀerent sortal, fall. I do not, however, think that this calls
into question anything said below; animals of diﬀerent kinds are, I feel, suﬃciently similar that we need not despair
of laying down some general guidelines for their individuation.
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which to test any account of the individuation of animals, drawing from these the suggestion
that no account of the individuation of living entities can succeed unless it makes reference to
their status as biological individuals. Following this, I shall brieﬂy note that the mere notion
of biological activity, unless supplemented by some coordinating process (best speciﬁed, I
think, by looking to an animal’s compositional features), cannot answer them. Although the
development of a detailed account of the individuation of biological things would merely
distract from the core thrust of this thesis, it is important to note that I do not mean to deny
that compositional features have some role to play in an organism’s individuation. This sug-
gestion will, as we shall see, play an important role in the background of our next chapter, in
which it is argued that death need not cause an organism to cease to exist.
In what follows, we shall take the following two possibilities to present a test for any
account of the individuation of living things:
Conjunction: In some circumstances, two individual organisms may come into existence
fused to one another (as with conjoined twins), or subsequently become aĴached to
one another.
Division: It is possible for a single unfortunate animal to lose a signiﬁcant amount of its body
mass (often more than half) and yet survive. Further, should its removed tissues be put
in the appropriate conditions (or like the limbs of a starﬁsh, be capable of regenerating
a living body), they might continue to engage in biological activity, and so be alive.
Any adequate account of the kind юћіњюљmust either provide uswith a principledway to dis-
tinguish animals from one another and to trace them through change in the above situations
or give us good reason to think that these are not cases in which there is a single metaphys-
ically correct way to individuate and track the entities involved.3 Although I am willing to
accept that there might sometimes be no deﬁnitive answer to individuative questions, I sup-
pose it clear that we can, and often do, make individuative judgements in cases such as the
above. Thus, for example, conjoined twins are ordinarily thought to be two organisms rather
3Onemight here followWiggins (2001, pp. 74–76) in thinking that it is possible to single out and answer questions
about individual animals without further possessing an entirely general method to determine how many animals
one encounters in any given situation. My contention here is simply that the cases raised above do not admit of such
individuative uncertainties.
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than one and we readily accept that earthworms might lose their posterior half (even when
this comprises the bulk of their mass) and yet survive to regenerate the lost segment of their
body. Hence, I submit that we ought to question how these judgements, which we seem ordi-
narily to make without diﬃculty, could be incorporated into an account of animality. If any
plausible view of animality is able to do exactly this (in a principled manner), this shall in
turn bolster our conﬁdence that no indeterminacy is involved in the above cases.
It is, I think, diﬃcult to see how any perspective upon animality might produce the cor-
rect description of the above cases without looking to the idea of an organism’s life (or its bi-
ological activities – construed suﬃciently widely as to include its actions). To my mind, any
promising alternative strategy for the individuation of animals must focus its aĴention on
the complex organic tissues from which they are made. Ultimately, such a strategy will lay
down a number of guidelines for picking out and separating from one another the bodies
of living organisms based upon their compositional features alone. As a toy example, one
might consider counting organisms by reference to the organ structures they possess, tying
each animal’s continued existence to those of its organs which are the most complex or have
the longest evolutionary pedigree. I see no reason to deny that one might individuate or-
ganisms in such a way; indeed, as I shall suggest in the fourth chapter of this thesis, I am
sympathetic to the suggestion that compositional considerations must play a crucial role in
the individuation of material substances. I do, however, doubt very much that it is satisfac-
tory to take the foregoing considerations to ground the continued existence of an animate
organism without ﬁrst tracing their connections to the biological activities of a living organ-
ism. There is, I take it, no real reason to think that either complexity or evolutionary novelty
are ontologically signiﬁcant (and hence, in this context, explanatory). Rather, if either of these
suggestions does light upon a reliable way to single out animals, this is ultimately because an
organ structure must be complex in order to coordinate the various aspects of an organism’s
life, or because life-preserving structures must have been among the ﬁrst (and hence themost
widespread) evolved adaptations (since no organism which lacked them could survive for
long enough for its other features to inﬂuence its reproductive success). These compositional
criteria thus allow us to successfully distinguish animals from one another only because they
(non-accidentally) coincide with a more fundamental criterion guiding the individuation of
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living organisms – one which references their capacities to sustain their own lives and to act
as uniﬁed entities. If this is so, we must accept that it is the notion of an entity’s life (or, as
we shall see, of its biological functions) which ultimately sustains the above suggestions re-
garding the individuation of animals, and not simply their structural features – it provides,
we might say, the most fundamental explanatory perspective upon the considerations which
ground the existence of such organisms.
I have above suggested that compositional suggestions cannot alone carry the weight of
an account of the individuation of living organisms. Rather, even if one must reference an or-
ganism’s tissues in order to identify it, this is fundamentally because of the deep connection
between the biological activities of an organism and those of its parts – a connection which
must be made explicit if one is to understand how an organism’s identity could be so inti-
mately tied to some of its parts. It is, of course, not a surprising discovery that the notion of
biological life is central to any account of what animals are. It is, however, surprisingly rare
to ﬁnd an extended discussion of the individuation of animals in the philosophical literature
surrounding identity. This omission is especially critical given that an ordinary understand-
ing of a life as constituted by a series of coordinated (possibly homeostatically regulated)
biological events is unlikely to provide us with the guidance necessary to tackle the problem
cases raised above; conjoined organisms may share their ‘lives’, thus understood, and lives
(and indeed the capacities to sustain them– a favourite method for connecting lives more
closely to individual organisms) may split in two without the organism involved ceasing to
exist.4 Lives must be tied much more closely to individual organisms if they are to aid us in
the development of an individuative view. It is, I think, highly likely that compositional con-
siderations will be relevant to this endeavour.5 Not only do such factors allow us to clearly
4Thus, for example, some entities reproduce by asexual budding. When this occurs, one object grows a distinct
organismwhose life it initially sustains. Following this, they separate from one another, each preserving the capacity
to sustain its own life. Often this does not involve the destruction of the initial organism,which continues its existence
whilst its oﬀshoot develops a life of its own.
5In connection with this, I recommend Aristotle’s suggestion as to how we may “decide whether [an animal with
duplicated organ systems] is one or is composed of several grown together by considering [its] vital principle” (773a7). Aris-
totle postulates that the ‘vital principle’ of an animal (that which enables it to exemplify its form) is particularly
associated with only one of its parts and subsequently submits that we should distinguish fused organisms from
one another by reference to these central parts. Hoﬀman and Rosenkranĵ develop this statement into an account
of the compositional unity of organisms, making much of the thought that some organs have “a more central role to
play in the uniﬁcation or organization of an organism’s parts than others” (Hoﬀman and Rosenkranĵ 1997, p. 124). This
is, I think, a plausible empirical conjecture and, should it be true, might easily be developed into an account of the
individuation of animals. Here, I shall note only two provisos. First, Hoﬀman and Rosenkranĵ, due to their concerns
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distinguish conjoined organisms despite their high degree of functional integration (and, fur-
ther, the degree to which each entity’s life might depend upon that of its sibling), they may
also be crucial to the individuation of animals whose behaviour is somehow aberrant, failing
to be coordinated in the manner characteristic of other members of their species – a sugges-
tion which will have some importance in our treatment of corpses, and whose merits will be
drawn out in more detail in the ﬁnal chapter of this thesis.
In the above, I have aĴempted to spell out the centrality of an organism’s life (and so, of its
biological kind) to its individuation. Any account of an organism’s characterising sort must
detail how organisms may be distinguished from one another and traced through change.
Even though it may seemplausible to think that onemight successfully identify organisms by
reference to independently identiﬁable aspect of their material composition (e.g. individual
organs and systems thereof), it is impossible to explain the ontological signiﬁcance of these
of its features unless one ﬁrst notes their close connection to the maintenance of its biological
activities. Hence, these suggestions may only be raised against the background assumption
that we aim to individuate a distinctive type of organic structure, characterised in a deep
manner by a speciﬁc type of biological activity. Armed with this, we might now turn to the
suggestion that a corpse cannot be counted as a living organism because the laws of biology
do not apply to it. Following this, the next chapter will develop the claim that animals need
not cease to exist upon their death.
2.3 Animals and Death
Since an organism’s body (and hence any of its parts which play a key role in its individu-
ation) mght remain in existence after its deaths (albeit in a non-functional state), we should
now turn to consider, in light of what has been said above, whether anything can be dead
and yet fall under the sort юћіњюљ. To set the stage, one might ﬁrst consider the suggestion
with questions of composition, make much of the role of an organism’s ‘master parts’ in regulating the activities of
its other parts. Wemight, however, instead accord more weight to a master part’s role in coordinating an organism’s
actions, rather than to its interactions with the organism’s other parts – a suggestionmore in keeping with Aristotle’s
own. Further, one should deny that the above entails that an organism must, throughout its existence, conserve a
single master part. This will, in turn, allow one to recognise that an organismmight, in clearly deﬁned circumstances
(such as the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a buĴerﬂy), break down and replace those of its parts on which its
existence previously centrally depended.
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that, since animals are living things and it is impossible for anything to be simultaneously
dead and alive, we must think the idea of a dead animal incoherent. This argument fails to
recognise that the statement that animals are living things says only that it is of the nature of
an animal to be alive – a nature which something might fail to exemplify fully whilst remain-
ing an animal. Similarly, even though watches tell the time, one might own a watch whose
internal mechanism has rusted to the point where it is unable to move.6 In light of this, one
might state instead that corpses fall under a kind of which they are poor exemplars, failing to
bear all the properties characteristic of their conspeciﬁcs, as, for example, would be a wing-
less bee. My aim here is to argue that we should consider the diﬀerences between dead and
living animals to be much more extensive than this, suggesting that we take the former not
to be animals at all.
2.3.1 Activity
To begin our argument, we might note the following claim of Wiggins, regarding the deter-
mination of an object’s kind:
All the doctrine [that whether or not an object falls under a given natural kind is
determined by its similarity to good exemplars of that kind] implies is that the
determination of a natural kind stands or falls with the existence of lawlike prin-
ciples, known or unknown, that will collect together the extension of the kind
around two or three good representatives of the kind […] To be something of that
kind is to exemplify the distinctive mode of activity that they determine (2001, p.
80)
In what follows, we shall question whether a dead animal is suﬃciently similar to its living
counterparts to instantiate the kind юћіњюљ. This is, in many ways, a diﬃcult question to an-
swer. A dead organism’s genetic material does not instantly degrade. Nor does it cease to
be physically akin to its living counterparts. Indeed, we cannot even make a case for their
6Once the position argued in this thesis has been set out, I would urge the reader to return to this point and
reconsider this judgement. I think that our conclusion applies equally to artefactual kinds as to those which are
natural.Nevertheless, since I amwilling to admit the existence of thingswhich fall under a kindwithout exemplifying
it well and I take it that the burden is upon me to give good reasons to take up my position, we shall proceed, for
now, upon the assumption that a broken watch is still a watch, albeit a bad one.
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diﬀerence in kind by appealing to the popular idea that a single mechanismmust account for
the similarities between the members of a natural kind (see, for example, Boyd 1999a; 1999b
and Millikan 1999); a corpse’s similarities to living organisms result from the very same pro-
cesses of reproduction and gene transcription as usually underwrite the similarities between
conspeciﬁcs. Thus far, then, it is not obvious that юћіњюљ does not apply to dead organisms
in the same way as it does to living ones.
Despite the above similarities, it is, I think, clearly false that a corpse exempliﬁes the dis-
tinctive mode of activity associated with its genetic and physiological structure. First, we
should note that it does not behave as does an ordinary living being; it has no means of
engaging with its external environment. Given that our interest in biological organisms is
arguably piqued by their impressive sensory and locomotive abilities (i.e. by their capacities
for coordinated action), a corpse’s complete lack of agency should immediately lead us to
suspect that it is not the same type of thing as is an animal; it simply cannot, one might say,
lead the same type of life as can an animal. Of course, this suggestion cannot be thought to be
conclusive when we look to animals whose nervous systems have been severely damaged, or
which are asleep. These entities similarly lack agential powers and yet seem still to be animals.
Cases such as these might easily lead one to think that death is simply an especially extreme
form of debilitation. In light of this suspicion, it is worth adding that not only do corpses
lack the agency of a living organism, there are also a range of basic biological activities which
characterise living organisms (and play an important role inmaintaining their physical unity)
but in which corpses do not engage. Soon after an organism’s biological death, the frenetic
metabolic activity which characterised its life ceases. Hence, those of its parts which played a
central role in individuating it cease to actively do anything to ensure its continued existence.
It is, I think, partly in virtue of this that we should ultimately suspect that corpses are not
biological organisms. Before proceeding to oﬀer some arguments for this conclusion, I shall
oﬀer a ﬁnal intuitive consideration in favour of the claim that corpses are very much unlike
living organisms.
It is, I think, central to many people’s thoughts about death that they can no longer be
harmed or beneﬁĴed after their deaths (even if their interests may be furthered or hindered
in awaywhich is, in some abstract sense, still of value for them). In contrast, however, a living
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animal may be beneﬁĴed or harmed even when it is in a coma. Indeed, there seem to be im-
portant constraints upon the manner in which we can interact with animals, even when they
are severely wounded, which are not mirrored in the case of corpses –whatever dignity we
must aﬀord to a corpse diﬀers hugely from that possessed by its living counter-parts. If one
takes up a fully Aristotelian perspective, according to which an entity’s kind determines not
only what it is natural for it to do but also, in the same stroke, what is good for that object, it is
natural to take this to show that something cannot be an organismwhen it is dead (for, other-
wise, onewould ascribe to it the very same ends aswe do to living organisms – an implausible
view). At the very least, this line of thought suggests that we are pre-philosophically inclined
to think that corpses are entirely diﬀerent kinds of things than are living organisms. However,
those who are less inclined than I am towards a teleology-heavy metaphysics are unlikely to
put much stock in this line of reasoning. Therefore, rather than developing it further, I shall,
in what follows, aĴempt to elaborate upon the notion of an animal’s characteristic features
so as to give us a ﬁrmer foundation for thinking that a corpse simply is not the same kind of
thing as a living animal.
2.3.2 Dead Things and Masses of Flesh
In contrast to much of the literature about animals, which focuses on their lower-level ca-
pacities to sustain their lives, I have above placed some emphasis upon what might be called
their ‘higher-level’ capacities – those in virtue ofwhichwe count them as purposive (and even,
in some cases, intelligent) beings, worthy of respect and special consideration. This, I think,
brings to the forefront the reason that life should strike us as such an interesting phenomenon;
our aĴention is focused upon biological kinds, for the most part, because an entity’s underly-
ing biology explains the existence (and operations) of its sensory-motive capacities. My aim
here is to argue that a corpse’s lack of biological life renders it no more interesting than any
other structured mass of organic maĴer – something which will lead us to think that it is not
any kind of organism at all.
Part of the relevance of the above is that it makes one question what legitimises the appli-
cation of the sortal юћіњюљ to any entity. One answer is, of course, physiological; an animal is
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any entity whose parts are arranged in the manner characteristic of some species (or a rough
approximation of this). Similarly, one might think the possession of organ systems whose
evolutionary function is to sustain biological life sets organisms apart from all other organic
things. These factors do, arguably, select features unique to living organisms (and indeed, if
speciﬁed further, can probably distinguish the animals frommany of their multicellular rela-
tives). Nevertheless, I think that their presence does not alone suﬃce to mark something out
as an animal. In connection with this, one might note the thought that kind terms provide
one with a strong basis for a vast range of inductive generalisations; upon coming to know
that some feature is common to a small (although reasonably diverse) sample of members of
a single kind, one is generally justiﬁed in assuming that it is also possessed by most of the
othermembers of that kind. Although living organismsmight share a variety of physiological
characteristics with their corpses, there is some sense in which these similarities are relatively
shallow, as indicated by Olson in the following quotation:
The changes that go on in an animal when it dies are really quite dramatic. All of
that frenetic, highly organized, and extremely complex biochemical activity that
was going on throughout the organism comes to a rather sudden end, and the
chemical machinery begins immediately to decay. If it looks like there is not all
that much diﬀerence between a living animal and a fresh corpse, that is because
the most striking changes take place at the microscopic level and below. (1997, p.
151)
This is in direct contrast to contemporary perspectives upon natural kind terms; such terms, it
is thought, do not merely collect together objects with a great variety of similarities but rather
apply only to those enetities whose resemblances are particularly signiﬁcant or deep. Further,
not only do members of natural kinds have a vast number of features in common with one
another, these commonalities also give one grounds for inductive predictions – determining
whatwill happen theirmembers in awide variety of circumstances. In contrast,whilst corpses
have very much in commonwith the living things which they once were, behaviourally, they
have few such commonalities; a corpse is guaranteed not to react to changes in its environ-
ment (internal or external) in the same way as a living organism because, of course, it cannot
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react at all. In this sense, then, it is very unlike any animal. Further, most of the empirically
sustained predictions we can make about the fate of a corpse (e.g. that its soft tissues will
rot away ﬁrst, leaving behind its hard tissues which will soon after be scaĴered) not only do
not hold of living organisms but are also equally true of almost any collection of once living
tissues. In virtue of this, then, one might think to group corpses not with living organisms
but instead with other dead tissues. This is, I think, correct to some degree. It is true that
biologists’ interests in living things do not, strictly speaking, carry over to corpses and that
the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these things should prevent us from applying the sort юћ-
іњюљ to dead organisms. However, as I shall suggest in our next chapter, I suspect that we
must make sense of a corpse’s persistence conditions by reference to those of a living being,
ultimately leading me to claim that a corpse is a derivative existent – individuated by a sortal
under which it does not fall. Nevertheless, I hope to have given good reason for doubting that
corpses exemplify the kind distinctive of their living counterparts.
Building upon the above, one should further note the intuitive thought that an organ-
ism’s physical conﬁguration, and that of its organs, is ‘for something’; these features have the
purpose of sustaining its life. In determining which things are living organisms, it is consid-
erations of vitality which have metaphysical importance – not merely facts about the conﬁg-
uration of an organism’s tissues. One might, of course, consider something to be an animal
just in case it contains organ systems whose functions are to support life, whether operative
at that time or not. However, I think it nevertheless important to note that we primarily take
interest in the conﬁguration of an organism’s organs only insofar as we are interested in its
life (and in the features which allow its life to continue). Since its organ systems are hence
only of subsidiary importance to the study of animals, we should be put in mind of the fol-
lowing claim, asserting that there is no point to applying a sortal to an object in the absence
of that which initially made it an interesting object of theoretical study:
But thewhole distinction [between a living organismand its remainswhendecom-
position has destroyed it] is parasitic upon the point of distinguishing between life
anddeath.Merematerial continuity is not suﬃcient. And if life or its absence gives
the point of these distinctions, then the principal distinction is between being live
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and being dead, and the best overall view will make existence or non-existence
depend upon the principal distinction. (Wiggins 1976, p. 143)
Although I shall shortly deny that the above thought justiﬁes us in taking an organism to
cease to exist upon its death, it does, I think, support the less radical (and hence, less theo-
retically costly) move of taking юћіњюљ only to apply to living entities. There is, one might
say, no real reason to take a dead organism to count as an animal; it does not (and cannot)
participate in the same type of activities as does a living organism. Indeed, its properties and
powers are more similar to those of other lumps of non-living ﬂesh (a natural contrast kind
to юћіњюљ) than they are to the paradigm exemplars of animality. Ultimately, indeed, the
ontological signiﬁcance of any considerations which individuate both living organisms and
corpses can only be seen once one traces their connection to an organism’s biological activi-
ties (even after they have ceased). Thus, I submit, we should think it a necessary condition of
anything exemplifying the kind юћіњюљ that it be alive. In what follows, I shall brieﬂy add to
this argument by suggesting that the conditions of a dead animal’s individuality are histori-
cal and so that corpses need not be individuated by a sort that they implement after the death
of their tissues. Following this, I shall summarise the key arguments of this chapter before, in
the next, presenting my reasons for denying that organisms cease to exist upon their deaths.
2.3.3 The Unity of a Dead Thing
There are, I think, a multitude of considerations which tell against a dead animal being any
kind of organism at all. I have above mentioned its lack of any sensory or agential capacities
and its inability to regulate its life processes. An important further observation reveals that
the basis for the individuality of a corpse is, unlike that of a living organism,merely historical.
Not only is it the case that a corpse has the parts that it has because of its past life processes
(something which is true of many of a living organism’s parts also), what determines that we
have only a single entity where a corpse is can sometimes reside only in the causal history of
its parts. This is, I think, the most signiﬁcant consideration in favour of the view that corpses
do not, at least typically, instantiate the kind юћіњюљ. To justify this conclusion, I shall note
that it is possible for multiple organisms to relate to one another in much the same way as
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might the parts of a single (albeit malformed) animal. This, I submit, shows that the basis
for counting dead entities is, in at least some cases, not contemporary with the things being
counted, suggesting that they are not instantiated by a sort which they exemplify at that time.
In defence of this position, we might begin by considering the case in which an organism
is, due to genetic mutation (as opposed to the assimilation of a twin in the womb– a much
less clear case), bornwith an additional, non-functioning head and the beginnings of its spinal
column. It is, I suspect, coherent to believe that there is here only a single organism despite
the presence in it of additional brain tissue which, were it undergoing further development,
would instead be associated with a diﬀerent organism. This situation, however, is physiologi-
cally not much diﬀerent fromwhat would result if one of two conjoined twins died, at which
point we might think that the dead twin’s corpse remained in existence (and distinct from its
sibling organism) at least for a liĴle while. If this is correct, then an organ’s past activitymight
be decisive in determining whether it is an inoperative part of a living organism (as with our
ﬁrst case) or whether it is associated with another dead organism aĴached to the ﬁrst. If this
case fails to seem compelling, one might instead look to species of organism which undergo
metamorphosis and, in the process, rebuild the parts which are centrally involved in coordi-
nating their movement and life processes. We might, for example, imagine that rather than
being broken down in the cocoon, much of a caterpillar’s nervous system simply becomes as-
similated (in a manner which renders it inoperable) into the body of the emerging buĴerﬂy.
Even if this would soon cause its death, it is, I think, intuitive to think that we have here a sin-
gle organism which contains a non-functioning nervous system, associated with no animal,
alongside its own.
In eﬀect, the above exploits the fact that one cannot tell, just by looking at the physical
arrangement of a single coherent mass of organic tissue (and their conﬁguration), howmany
organisms are there in existence (should the reader remain unconvinced by the, admiĴedly,
far-fetched examples referenced above, the same point could in principle be made using sur-
gical examples).7 Hence, wemust, in order to individuate organisms, look to the nature of the
processes occurring in them, and the causal histories of their parts. Given that a corpse’s parts
7To connect this to what is to come in the next chapter, one might state that mere description of the physical
arrangement of an organism’s tissues does not always, by itself, detail how that organism’s parts are metaphysically
organised (in a sense relevant to its individuation).
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are devoid of biological function, and the connections between them degrade very quickly,
it seems to me that there is no principle to which one can appeal, contemporaneous with the
corpse’s existence, which individuates it. There is hence, I submit, no need to take it to fall
under any individuative sort at that moment in time. I shall suggest in the following chapter
that this does not give us good reason to think that there is no such thing as an individual
corpse; even in the case of living organisms, one must appeal to the past history of some of an
organism’s parts in order to determine that they are not merely aĴached to it. Nevertheless,
if one believes, as I do, that the application of the sortal юћіњюљ to an entity ought, by itself,
to individuate it (at least when there is some determinate answer regarding the number of
animals that there are to ﬁnd), I should suggest that this reveals that this sortal does not, prop-
erly speaking, apply to corpses. Since the individuality of a corpse stems from its history, we
ought not to think of corpses as animals.8
2.4 Summary
To summarise the above, albeit under a new slant, we might begin with the thought that
it is necessary, if we are to formulate biological generalisations, to determine which objects
are subject to them. To do this, we must distinguish biological entities from one another, and
fromobjects of other kinds, ofwhich those generalisations need not be expected to hold. In the
case of biology, two such suggestions immediately raise themselves; the idea of a life and that
of an organic structure. The laĴer suggestion alone, I have argued, fails to appropriately ex-
plain the connection it draws between an entity’s identity and various of its organs. Hence, it
must be supplemented by reference to an organsim’s life, and to the activities and behaviours
characteristic of organisms, if it is to give us individuative guidance. This, I think, draws it
to our aĴention that the individual organism is an interesting unit of biological explanation
primarily because organisms behave in a singular manner (albeit in a way underwriĴen by
8This view has the, perhaps unwelcome consequence that a frankensteinian collection of tissues cannot, however
well they are arranged, compose a single object of the samemetaphysical kind as a corpse. Although I shall not tackle
this example in this thesis, I suspect that one might amend our view to say instead that there exist multiple ways
to produce focally organised collections of tissue which are, in some sense, individuable by reference to the kind
юћіњюљ. It is important, however, to note that here, just as in the case of ordinary corpses, it is the causal history of
Frankenstein’s parts (and not their present operation) by reference to which he is to be individuated, cementing our
claim that юћіњюљ does not apply to him at the time at which he exists.
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distinctive physiological adaptations). Going upstream from any particular account of the
sort юћіњюљ, we might see that corpses, despite their similarities to living organisms, aren’t
typically the subject maĴer of wide-ranging biological explanations and generalisations; they
are, in fact, liĴle more interesting than some other organic structures from which individual
organisms are frequently distinguished. From this, it follows that we should not take corpses
to be animals. An obvious conclusion to draw from this is that no biological organism is iden-
tical to any corpse; since the individuative concepts of biology cannot be, the above suggests,
phases of any other (more fundamental) sortal concept to whose application life is ultimately
irrelevant, no animal can be identical to any non-animal. In the next chapter, I shall argue
that it would be premature to draw this conclusion. Although contemporary philosophical
arguments often fail to show the identity of corpse and living organism, close aĴention to the
degree of dependence of a corpse upon its living counterpart heavily suggests that they are
one and the same thing.
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Cѕюѝѡђџ 3
Is Death the End?
This chapter discusses the so-called ‘termination thesis’ – the view that any living entity (al-
though it is most usually raised in discussions of personhood) will cease to exist at the point
of its biological death. It is unclear to me whether the denial or acceptance of this thesis is
more natural. Nevertheless, many philosophers have voiced strong opinions in each direc-
tion, although their arguments (particularly in favour of the termination thesis) do not seem
forceful to me. My aim in this chapter is to add my voice to those who reject the termination
thesis. I shall not deal here with arguments in its favour (to my mind, all those which do so
illegitimately move from the claim voiced above, that biological life is particularly central to
the elucidation of the sortal юћіњюљ, to the assertion that nothing can cease to fall under юћ-
іњюљ without ceasing to exist). Instead, I shall here develop the suggestion that the fact that
a corpse maintains several of the physiological features of the living thing which it (I argue)
was provides us with suﬃcient grounds to aﬃrm their identity. This then delivers on my
promise to show that an object might exist without falling under the sort which individuates
it.
3.1 The Termination Thesis
The view that ‘we’ (human persons) are no longer ‘around’ after our deaths is ancient, going
back at least to Lucretius. It is generally known as the ‘Termination Thesis’. Here, I shall focus
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upon a slightly diﬀerent form of this thesis, explicitly concerned with organisms rather than
with the things which we are.1 My aim in this section is not only to introduce this thesis, but
also to persuade the reader that I need not consider in detail the positive arguments in its
favour. Instead, I shall simply seek suﬃcient reason to reject it, looking particularly at the
diﬃculties associated with individuating the corpses of ‘dead animals’.
The termination thesis, uponwhich the remainder of our discussion shall be focused, may
be formulated as follows:
Termination: Animals cease to exist at the time at which they die.
There are, I think, three terms of art involved in this statement of the termination thesis. First,
of course, we must have some understanding of what it takes for an object to be an animal.
This, I take it, is suﬃciently handled in our previous chapter; an animal is an entity which en-
gages in a variety of centrally coordinated behaviours and metabolic processes (about which
one can make a range of informative generalisations). We shall understand the cessation of
an entity’s existence to involve it ceasing to to have various things (present-tensedly) predi-
cated of it, its lack of spatial location after a certain point in time or its non-concreteness.2 This
then leaves us with the notion of biological death which can, I think, be understood in two
ways. First, given what I have said in the previous chapter, one might simply state that an
organism dies when юћіњюљ ceases to apply to it. If so, then the termination thesis should be
understood simply to claim that юћіњюљ is what DummeĴ labels a ‘presently essential’ prop-
erty (1973, p. 130) – one which, if it ever applies to some entity, must apply to it at every later
time in its existence.3 Alternatively, we might characterise biological death independently as
1I, following Snowdon (2014) and Olson (2004; 2014), among others, take these to be mere notational variants
upon a single question. Nevertheless, it is, perhaps, clearer to consider our question in the context of organisms
whose lives don’t display the moral and psychological proﬁles which make human persons particularly interesting
objects of study (and lead some to think that we must be something other than organisms). An additional advantage
of this route lies in the fact that my argument is not intended to establish that no organisms cease to exist upon their
death, but only that some do not. By excising the case which will raise the most complications, it becomes easier to
focus our aĴention upon the generic claim that ‘organisms continue to exist as their corpses’.
2One might instead be more blunt, claiming that something ceases to exist through coming not to present-
tensedly exist (or, alternatively, to exist at the present time). Each of these translations, however, commits one to
the view that existence statements admit of temporal qualiﬁcation (either through tense or through relativity to
times). This thesis is controversial, and so I present the above alternatives, which preserve everything of importance
in the termination thesis, while remaining neutral on issues surrounding the semantics of existence statements.
3This notion is slightly weaker than the more prevalent ‘substance sortal’. Whilst people often claim that it is
true of any object (de re) that it necessarily falls under the substance sortal which individuates it, I wish here to
avoid such claims about de re modality; despite their very real signiﬁcance for any account of individuation, they
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the cessation of an organism’s metabolic processes (or a large enough subset of them) and
ask whether the organism must cease to exist when those processes are discontinued. I have
argued above that these accounts of death dovetail; something cannot be an organism if its
metabolic processes have ceased. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile distinguishing them here, es-
pecially as this reveals that it is not obvious that an organismmust cease to exist upon failing
to fall under the sortal юћіњюљ; if this were a maĴer of pure stipulation, then, I feel, it would
be impossible to connect any substantive debate to our ﬁrst interpretation of biological death.
My aim in what follows is to show that we have good reason to identify a living organism
with its corpse and should therefore reject the termination thesis.
3.1.1 The Corpse Problem
It strikes me that there is no real ‘default’ view upon the termination thesis, to be bolstered
or unseated by philosophical considerations. One diﬃculty for this thesis, however, is partic-
ularly salient. It is rare for an organism’s death to destroy all traces of its previous existence.
Usually, in fact, what remains is a corpse – a body made from organic tissues in much the
same arrangement as those of the living organism from which it came. The termination the-
sis entails that the corpse is distinct from that organism. One might then raise a number of
questions about its individuation. To begin with, we shall consider how long the corpse has
been in existence. There seem to me to be three non-arbitrary options, none of which, I shall
argue, are wholly satisfactory.
First, one might view the corpse as something always coincident with, although separate
from, the organism which died; it is individuated suﬃciently diﬀerently that it, unlike the
organism, might survive death. This, however, falls afoul of much that was said in the last
chapter. There I gave reason to think that one might only individuate organisms (and hence
anything always coincident with them) by reference to their biological lives. Thus, the corpse,
for most of its career, may be individuated only by reference to its counterpart organism. It is,
in some sense, an eternally derivative object, deﬁned as ‘the structure of a living organism’,
raise complexities which need not delay us here. Hence, I aim to leave room for the proposal that I cannot survive
death but that I could have existed without ever having lived. Similarly, I do not wish here to commit my opponent
to the claim that anything which is once an organism must have been an organism at every previous point in its
existence – another natural view whose merits are peripheral to the main thrust of our discussion.
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where something’s ‘structure’ is here thought to change its parts as it does but need not be
destroyed when that thing ceases to exist. If one is willing to allow the sortal юћіњюљ so much
importance in the individuation of things which can outlast biological death, it is hard to see
whywe should then deny to organisms the privilege of enduring their death. This is, I suggest,
preferable to postulating the existence of an extra object which is individuated by reference
to the same set of life processes as a living organism but which, unlike the organism, has
the additional ability to survive the its death (even though its persistence conditions remain
derived from those of its counterpart organism).
Second, one might think that the things which are corpses only come into existence at the
point of an organism’s death. A corpse, on this view, cannot exist anywhere that there is an
organism. To my knowledge, there are two reasons to hold this view. First, one might reject
the idea that two objects might be located in the same space at any time. This entails that
whatever remains when an organism ceases to exist must, if it is approximately the same size
and shape as that organismwas, be newly created at the point of that organism’s death. Alter-
natively, one might chalk the distinctness of these entities to the fact that their physical unity
must be explained in diﬀerent ways. To use a simple example, an animal might ensure the
movement of glucosemolecules from its bloodstream to its cells through a variety ofmethods
(e.g. cellular absorption of water, by active transport, will decrease the concentration of glu-
cose in the cells, thus facilitating the diﬀusion of glucose into them). These methods ensure
the continuous turnover of itsmaĴer and, in so doing, override (or exploit) the natural tenden-
cies of molecules to adhere to one another, and to reach a point of equilibrium through their
randommovement across cellular membranes. In the absence of life, however, these physical
processes are no longer thus regulated, and so they act on the organism’s structure in ways
which they did not previously. Because of this, one might think, a corpse has a diﬀerent struc-
ture from that of a living organism and so should be thought to be an entirely new being – its
parts are, one might say, dynamically held together in a vastly diﬀerent way than they for-
merly were. Against this perspective, I should only like to note that a dead organism decays
rapidly, in large part because of this change in the processes which act upon its structure. The
occurrence of decay should not, I think, be thought to be away inwhich an organism’s corpse
coheres and is ‘held together’ (i.e. a way in which its structure is preserved) but rather a way
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in which its structure is destroyed. We do not, on this way of viewing things, obtain a new
structure when we let nature claim back a corpse and so there are no grounds for thinking
that a corpse is a ‘new thing’; rather, it is an old thing which is rapidly ceasing to exist. Hence,
I think that this line of argument works beĴer in the context of the claim that corpses do not
exist, to which this chapter ultimately aims to provide an alternative. Here, however, I shall
simply summarise by saying that, whatever reasons might be given for thinking that a corpse
is created by the death of a living organism, it is certainly a strange discovery. I therefore think
it quite reasonable to consider this to be an unnecessarily costly explanation of the existence
of corpses.
As a third alternative, one might think that corpses are a type of biological structure en-
tirely diﬀerent from living organisms, but yet hold that the laĴer are always associated with
such structures. On this view, wherever there is an organism, there is also another thing of
the same kind as a corpse.4 I shall call such an entity a ‘corpus’ in what follows. Corpuses are
individuated in an entirely diﬀerent manner from living organisms, and so we may expect
them to exist for a diﬀerent amount of time than do the organisms with which they are asso-
ciated – potentially coming into and going out of existence as the organism goes about its day
to day life.5 Against this view, I worry that no theoretically satisfying account of corpuses
will be forthcoming. To see this, we might begin by asking whether a corpus can survive any
change in its parts. If such an entity cannot even lose its parts, then it follows that very few
corpses last for very long, since decay involves the loss of their maĴer to the outside world.
Thus, when we watch an organism’s remains decompose, we in fact see a succession of enti-
ties come into, and then go out of, existence. This is, I think, unacceptable; if one believes that
something is left behind after an organism’s death, it seems, at ﬁrst sight, to be a relatively
long-lasting (albeit unstable) biological structure. Thus, I think that we should instead accept
that a corpus might lose some of its maĴer without thereby ceasing to exist. This admission,
however, raises additional individuative problems. To see this, imagine ﬁrst that we think
that a corpus might only lose parts but never gain any. This should lead us to question what
4This approach has a long pedigree, stretching back even to Locke (1975, ch. 27). More recently, however, it has
quite rightly gone out of fashion.
5Indeed, on this view, two conjoined organisms might also share a single corpus – one should not here commit
to the view that corpuses must be exactly spatially coincident with their counterpart organisms.
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happens to an organism’s corpus when it gains a new part. If corpuses can’t gain parts, then
its corpus does not do so. Nevertheless, given that an organism’s corpus (if it is to correspond
at all to what we ordinarily think of as a corpse) must, at the point of death, have the very
same parts as that organism, we should therefore accept that there also comes into existence
a new corpus of which the previous one is only a part. This is, again, I think a surprising con-
clusion, and one which is best avoided. Indeed, there exist very few objects which we think
can lose but not gain parts in this manner. Hence, wemay instead wish to pursue the thought
that corpuses can sometimes increase in size. Although I shall not substantiate this claim here,
I doubt very much that any account of such entities could be given without reference to the
compositional unity of a living organism (at least without, in some situations, leading us to
say extremely strange things). This notion of a corpus is, I feel, a philosopher’s ﬁction, sim-
ply invented to ﬁnd us something to identify with an organism’s dead body, no maĴer how
unnatural that object should be. It will therefore be set aside in what follows.
The above reveals that it is diﬃcult to distinguish a corpse from its counterpart living or-
ganism in a satisfactory manner. Given this, one might instead be tempted to deny that there
are such composite individuals; instead, we might think that a so-called corpse is simply a
collection of organic molecules arranged in a remarkably complexmanner. Although I do not
doubt that much could be said in favour of this view, it is important to note that it is primarily
motivated by our lack of a satisfactory alternative. Since, then, this view is extremely revision-
ary, I shall not here consider positive arguments in its favour. Instead, in what is to follow, I
hope to demonstrate that an adequate account can be given of a corpse’s compositional unity
if we ascribe to it much the same characterisation as we do to a living organism (leading me
to identify the two).
3.2 Ayers and Historic Dependence
We might conclude from the above that the proponent of the termination thesis must give
us positive reason to think that no animal is identical to any corpse. In the remainder of this
chapter, I aim to develop a line of thought, originating with Michael Ayers, which suggests
that no such account will be forthcoming. On Ayers’ view, we should understand the maĴer
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which composes an organism to be uniﬁed in such a way that it might continue to compose
that entity after its biological death. I begin here by unpacking this suggestion. Following
this, following sections will examine and ﬁnd lacking three reasons for thinking corpses to
be diﬀerent things from living organisms.
In commenting upon Locke’s claim that we might distinguish a living organism, whose
identity consists in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly ﬂeeting
particles of maĴer, in succession vitally united to the same organized body (1975, ch. 27, §6), from
the mere mass of maĴer which is its body, Ayers presents the following claim:
The continuedunity of a plant or animal after death obviously cannot be aĴributed
to its continuing life, but even before death the conditions of its physical coher-
ence at any time were laid down by previous, rather than current, life-processes.
An animal or plant is not uniﬁed or given physical deﬁnition by a mysterious, in-
stantly active life-force. There is no such force as so constitutes the unity of the thing
that, when the force is switched oﬀ, the unity instantly and necessarily evaporates.
(1991a, p. 224)
This is, I think, an insightful comment. In unpacking its truth, one should begin by noting
that Ayers bookends this claim with the following two assertions, with which he takes it to
be intimately linked:
To apply a predicate like ‘horse’ or ‘man’ to an object is not to pick out something
other than the independently identiﬁable, materially concrete, discrete thing be-
fore one, but is to classify that thing itself: to aĴribute to itmembership of a natural
class in virtue of its origin and structure. (ibid)
The sense in which life is the ‘principle of unity’ of a living thing is one which pre-
supposes that ‘unity’ can be understood in other terms. These terms are supplied
by our inescapable recognition of material coherence and discreteness. (ibid)
These quotations might initially suggest that Ayers takes there to be a single account of any
object’s compositional unity, couched in the notion of a physically discrete object whose parts
move together. On this understanding of his views, an organism’s life-processes might cause
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its parts to come together but need not be referenced at all in order to determine which things
are among its parts; instead, we may consider anything that is suﬃciently rigidly aĴached to
that entity to be one of its parts. Ayers, however, immediately departs from this reading in
claiming that stones and plastic hip-joints cannot become part of living organisms, no maĴer
how ﬁrmly they become embedded within them (ibid, pp. 224–225). Indeed, he further coun-
tenances the possibility that conjoined twins are, despite being rigidly aĴached to one another,
two individuals rather than one. We cannot then understand his view to rest upon the idea
that life processes are never of ontological, or compositional, signiﬁcance; such processes, it
would seem, are intimately involved in distinguishing an organism’s parts from those things
which are merely aĴached to it (or which, as in the case of a stone embedded within an oak,
it has grown around). Instead, our account of an organism’s compositional features must, as
does our account of its individuation, make reference to its life processes.
Onemust similarly be careful not to overstate the claim that “the conditions of [a living organ-
ism’s] physical coherence at any time were laid down by previous, rather than current, life-processes”
(ibid, p. 224). It is easy to interpret this as a denial that a dead organism’s parts relate to one
another in a diﬀerent manner than do the parts of a living organism. Thus understood, it is,
I think, easy to understand why a corpse should be thought identical to its living counter-
part; death does not signiﬁcantly alter the explanation we give of the continued unity of an
organism’s body (in each case, we reference only what has previously occurred within that
organism), and so wemight easily take it to retain its structure through death. This, however,
is both inconsistent with Ayers’ claim that an object’s “material unity is itself a function of [the ob-
ject’s] jointly operating parts” (ibid, p 87) and patently false.Whilst living organisms coordinate
the activities of their parts in order to keep themselves from returning to a state of thermody-
namic equilibrium, a corpse’s cells often cannibalise one another or, through enzymic activity,
digest themselves. Hence, as mentioned above, a corpse’s parts do not sustain its material co-
herence (understood as a “a dynamic, lasting relation, not a momentary state” (ibid)) but rather,
absent outside inﬂuence, cause it to slowly erode. We should, therefore, accept that a living
organism’s tissues are held together in a somewhat diﬀerent manner than those of a corpse
and look elsewhere for the truth in Ayers’ comments.
I have above suggested that Ayers means neither to give an entirely general account of
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the considerations which determine whether or not one thing is among another’s parts nor to
claim that a corpse’s parts are related to one another inmuch the sameway as those of a living
organism; each of these things appears inconsistent with other elements of his views. How
then might we understand his claim that a living thing’s material unity does not instantly
dissipate upon its death? The point, I suspect, lies in the contrast between two interpretations
of the notion of ‘material unity’. When we ask how an organism’s parts are uniﬁed, wemight
mean simply to ask how they are, at that time, aĴached to one another and how they inter-
act with one another. In answering this question, one must note not only that an organism’s
body is not instantly destroyed by its death (showing that its living parts are, at any time,
tied together by more than its life-processes) but also that a great number of an its parts (e.g.
its hair, nails and peripheral skin tissues) might, at any point, lack biological activity and so
be “excluded from the ‘common life’ [of the organism’s tissues]” (ibid, p. 225). I take Ayers to con-
clude from this that, whilst an organism’s parts must always remain aĴached to one another,
there are few, if any, further restrictions upon the relations in which they may stand to one
another whilst remaining among its parts.6 In this sense then, the organism’s “unity is open to
explanation in each case in more primitive terms” and is not constituted by its life processes (ibid,
p. 224). Since an organism’s parts do not instantaneously separate from one another upon its
death but instead remain united in a similar way to those parts of its body in which biolog-
ical activity was previously absent, Ayers concludes, we should not say that the organism’s
continued unity, understood in this weaker sense, relies upon its life processes. Hence, he
concludes, death is not the end of the physically uniﬁed object which is the living organism.
Complementary to the above is an alternative interpretation of the organism’s material
unity, corresponding to the question ‘what determines what are among its parts?’ To this,
I take it, Ayers is willing to accept that an organism’s life-processes are relevant. Here, he
6The notion of ‘aĴachment’ employed here requires some revision to actually make sense of the parthood rela-
tions enjoyed by the organism. As Hoﬀman and Rosenkranĵ point out (1997, pp. 99–100), many of an organism’s
parts are not rigidly aĴached to one another (thus, for example, one’s red blood cells are free to move in the blood-
stream independently of one another). One cannot, therefore, claim that ‘aĴachment’ unites an organism’s parts at
any time. Instead, a looser notion must be used, which recognises that an organism’s blood cells remain among its
parts after their generation because they are ‘contained’ by its tissues (which are rigidly aĴached to one another) in
such away as tomovewith it.Whatever revisions are necessary here, I verymuch doubt that onewill ultimately need
to explain the continued unity of a thing’s parts in terms of any relations unique to the parts of living organisms; in-
stead, perfectly ordinary notions of suspension, containment, origin and aĴachment will suﬃce to fully characterise
the relations between the items already recognised to be among an organism’s parts.
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references the idea of an object’s “historic causal connection with the [organism’s] life” (ibid, p.
225), stating that tissues grafted onto an entity might “become a part of the individual by com-
ing to participate in [its] common life” (ibid). I interpret this to mean that Ayers accepts that
there might be stringent conditions upon the ‘assimilation’ of new maĴer into an organism,
such that nothing might come to be part of a living organism without ﬁrst participating in its
life. However, subsequent to this, it is suﬃcient for something to remain part of that organ-
ism that it stay aĴached to it; it need not further remain caught up with the organism’s life.
Hence, even if an organism may only assimilate new material whilst it remains alive, it is, I
think, unproblematic to hold that its parts might remain uniﬁed in the ﬁrst of the senses here
disambiguated (and so continue to compose it) after its life-processes have ﬁnally (and irre-
versibly) stopped. Once we are put in mind of this, it becomes evident that the change in the
interactions between an organism’s parts at the point of its death gives us liĴle reason to con-
sider it to cease to exist; they retain, for some time, enough structural integrity to underwrite
the organism’s continued existence, albeit as a rapidly decaying corpse.
To conclude, I have above set out an Ayersian view, which I shall subsequently call the
‘historic dependence account’ according to which the unity of an organism’s parts does not
instantly dissipate upon its death. In so doing, I have warded oﬀ two misinterpretations of
Ayers’ views. The ﬁrst of these overstates Ayers’ claim that the ‘unity’ of an organism’s parts
is independent of its life, suggesting that he takes a bare notion of ‘material coherence’ to
fully determine which things are its parts. That many of Ayers’ statements are inconsistent
with this view strongly mitigates against it. The second, on the other hand, allows that the
relations constitutive of an organism’s unity might be unique to living things but claims that
they continue, entirely unchanged, upon its death. This is obviously false. Instead, I have
suggested that Ayers holds that an organism’s life processes are highly relevant to its assim-
ilation of new parts (since it standardly alters its composition by integrating new materials
into the ‘common life’ of its parts) but thinks that, beyond this initial constraint, something
need only remain aĴached to the organism’s body in order to remain among its parts. Death
certainly prevents (or at least slows down) an organism’s assimilation of new material. On
its own, however, this gives us no reason to think that it ceases to exist; rather, the organism
loses the ability to maintain its unity, which subsequently breaks down as the corpse decays.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to take on a number of objections to this thesis, due
mainly to Hershenov and to Olson. In showing these to be misplaced, I hope to sharpen the
thesis under consideration, allowing me to conclude with a fuller statement of this view.
3.3 Objections to the Historic Dependence Account
In this section, I consider three objections to our suggestion that an organism does not cease
to exist when it dies. I shall begin by taking on the claim that this view provides us with insuf-
ﬁcient guidance as to the persistence conditions of a corpse, arguing that we can understand
a corpse’s persistence conditions simply by reference to the organisation of the living thing
which it was. This has, I argue, the advantage of giving a wholly general account of what
it takes for an organism to remain in existence throughout its life, as well as after its death.
Subsequently, I shall take on the claim, made by Hershenov, that, unlike in the case of living
organisms, there is no principled way to make sense of the compositional unity we ascribe to
dead bodies. Hershenov maintains that we cannot provide a satisfactory account of the ways
in which corpses, but not living organisms, can change (and other ways in which only the lat-
ter change) – a claim which I aim to unseat in what follows. Hershenov additionally asserts
that, even if one does draw such a view out of the historic dependence account, it is implausi-
ble to hold, as onemust, that the persistence conditions of a corpse are parasitic upon those of
a living body. Since I shall argue exactly this, I shall not here discuss this laĴer claim– taking
the overall plausibility of the views I later present to count against it. In the ﬁnal subsection
of our discussion, I turn to brieﬂy detail why I think we ought to believe organisms to exist
beyond their deaths, even though they then lack those features central to the application of
their individuative sort.
3.3.1 No Principled Guidance
When considering the notion of a dead, but once living, body, the complaint which one most
often hears is that no account can be given of the changes which such an entity could survive.
In contrast to this, one might claim, the view that an organism ceases to exist when it dies
gives us a fairly clear perspective on the organism’s destruction. Even if it is often impossible
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to determine exactly when an organism’s life is over, the notion of ‘death’ gives us a clear
grasp of exactly what is necessary for an organism’s continued existence. In contrast, it is not
immediately evident thatwe have any insight into the features required for a corpse to remain
in existence, or even how we could beĴer our understanding of this. In this subsection, I aim
to take on exactly this criticism, showing that there is, in fact, a principled way to specify the
conditions under which a corpse will cease to exist. One need only, I shall suggest, look back
to the life which it once had.
To begin, we might consider the following quotation from Olson, which is paradigmatic
of the accusation considered here:
A second problem for the historic-dependence account is that it tells us so liĴle
about what it takes for an organism to persist when it’s dead. The problem is not
merely that it appeals to conditions whose obtaining is a maĴer of degree without
specifying that degree: that it doesn’t say, even vaguely, what proportion of the
original particles suﬃces, or how similar their arrangement must remain to the
original one. More serious is that it gives no information about what happens to a
corpse in a range of important cases …what happens if the corpse is cut precisely
in half? Does it go with one of the halves? If so, which one? Does it maĴer where
the cut ismade?…There aremany diﬀerent and incompatibleways of proceeding,
and I see no principled way of deciding among them. The reason is that I have no
idea what happens to a corpse if a hand falls oﬀ, or it is cut in half, or the like. Nor,
to my knowledge, does anyone else (2013, p. 93)
To see how to dispel this objection, we might make note of the grounds upon which it is
based. In essence, the diﬃculties raised by Olson reﬂect the fact that the historic dependence
account, as elaborated above, only tells us how an organism might lose or gain parts. Con-
sequently, it, as yet, gives us no insight into what changes will destroy that entity or how
we may distinguish it from other objects which also have a historical connection with it (as
might come to exist were our corpse to be split into several pieces). Once we have recognised
this inadequacy in our presentation of the account above, it is easy to see that it is an entirely
general problem, applying even to changes which the organism undergoes in the course of
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its life; indeed, this is precisely what the previous chapter recognised in noting that the mere
idea of biological life may not always be suﬃcient for the individuation of organisms. Hence,
I propose that we answer such problems by asking what would happen to a living organism
were it to undergo similar changes. After defending this suggestion, I shall suggest that the
similarities between the individuation of dead and living organisms cement the claims of the
former to be structurally analogous to the laĴer – highlighting the truth in Ayers’ observation
that an organism’s structural unity does not dissipate at the point of death.
Olson above suggested that there is no principled way to determine what would happen
to a corpse if we were to slice it precisely in half. In answer to this accusation, I think that we
need only to consider what happens to a living organismwhen it undergoes parallel changes.
To further elaborate, we might imagine that each half of the mutilated organism’s body is
quickly sealed and placed on some kind of life support, which keeps most of its tissues from
dying. When it is entirely clear what happens to the organism, we might ask why the same
answer should not describe our butchery of an organism’s corpse. Here, I can think of only
one response. It is, I think, standard to approach such bisection cases by asking whether one
half is appreciably beĴer equipped, after being removed from its counterpart, to sustain its
own existence. If so, one continues, that half should be identiﬁed with the original organism
after it undergoes bisection. Thus, for example, Olson claims that one may identify an organ-
ism with its severed head because the head (in virtue of retaining the organism’s brainstem)
retains the capacity to co-ordinate the organism’s life processes whilst its torso simply con-
tains a number of organs which will, absent the controlling inﬂuence of the brainstem, fail
to coordinate their activities (1997, pp. 132–133). In contrast, not only does a corpse not have
any life processes to regulate, its tissues also rapidly decay, to such a point that they are en-
tirely unable to sustain biological activity. Thus, one might claim, such considerations are
inapplicable to cases in which corpses are cut into pieces.
In response to this argument, it is, I think, important to note that we aĴribute to a severed
head the capacity to sustain its life only because it retains structures which ordinarily play
a critical role in the coordination of its biological activities and not because those structures
successfully continue to regulate the activities of the organism’s remaining parts; a severed
head, unless it is placed on external life support, will quickly die and, in the process of doing
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so, lose its capacity to coordinate the activities of the parts which it retains. In light of this,
we might ask what signiﬁcance we should place upon the fact that those structures retain
the ability to function normally (if connected appropriately to replacement organs). I should
here suggest that we ought not to think that this is of considerable importance; we are, for
example, perfectly willing to allow that a person whose brainstem has undergone signiﬁcant
damage (and so cannot function normally) might continue to exist if we ﬁnd an alternative
way to coordinate the activities of her vital organs. Continuing this thought, we might under-
stand a living organism to be ‘focally organised’ around those of its systems which are most
intimately involved in the coordination of its activities (allowing that which tissues these are
might change in the course of an organism’s growth and development, as happens, for exam-
ple, in the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a buĴerﬂy). It is, we might say, the retention
of these tissues which establishes itself as central to the organism’s continued existence even
while it is alive, complicated only by the fact that it might change its organisation by assim-
ilating new material and growing new organ systems (as, for example, occurs during the
development of a fetus’ central nervous system). It seems to me unproblematic to extend this
suggestion to the individuation of corpses, which retain much of their internal structure until
they are in a relatively advanced state of decay (at which point I suspect one should deny
that they still exist, citing as evidence the fact that a decaying corpse is liable to fall apart
upon being moved and so can no longer be thought to be a single coherent entity). Hence we
might simply state that a corpse remains in existence just in case it retains ‘enough’ of the tis-
sues around which it is focally organised (where this is determined by questioning whether
the organism, as it was at the point of its death, would remain in existence were it to retain
exactly those tissues).7 This account then aligns our judgements about animal identity with
those about corpses. It also explains how this could be more than an ad hoc manoeuvre by
puĴing a commonsensical gloss upon the idea that an organism’s tissues are (both before and
after its death) organised in a way which is relevant both to its unity and to its persistence.
7Alternatively, we might claim that a corpse must retain more of its central tissues than may a living organism
(including, in the case of the higher animals, almost all of its central nervous system). This approach, which I prefer,
is justiﬁed by the thought that a living organism is, through its life-processes, able to undergo structural rearrange-
ments which a corpse cannot when tissue is removed from it. A living organism’s loss of regulatory tissue, we might
say, causes it to relate to its body in a dramatically diﬀerent way than it did previously – something which does not
occur when a corpse is taken apart. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, I shall not implement this preferred
account in what follows.
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I therefore reject Olson’s claim that no workable and theoretically motivated account can be
given of the constraints upon a corpse’s persistence.
Whilst the above cannot be taken to give the ﬁnal word about an organism’s persistence
after death, I hope at least to have shown that it is less clear than Olson presumes that no prin-
cipled account can be given of a corpse’s persistence through change. I take it that we need
only look to the way in which a living organism’s tissues are structured in order to determine
how much material a corpse might lose through decay or other accident. A corpse is, struc-
turally speaking, very similar to a living organism even though death deprives it of the ability
to actively change its structure – assimilating newmaterial or changing the organisation (and
relative importance of its parts). We should hence understand its persistence conditions ac-
cordingly, saying that it remains in existence for just as long as it retains the structures which
previously were central to the coordination of its activity.
3.3.2 Changing Part-Whole Relationships
I have above suggested that we understand the relationship between a corpse and its parts
to derive from that of the living organism which it once was. A living organism, we might
say, assimilates material from its surroundings and, through doing so, maintains and alters
its internal structure (which, I have suggested, is, metaphysically even if not physically, cen-
tered upon certain of its parts). Anything which it absorbs remains part of it for as long as it
continues to be appropriately aĴached to it. Once the organism dies, however, many of the
processes by which it assimilates new tissues stop, and so the organism’s existence becomes
tied to its maintenance of (signiﬁcant aspects of) the structure which it had at the point of
its death. On the face of it, this view appears to give a precise and theoretically motivated
account of an organism’s persistence conditions, whether alive or dead. This claim, however,
is disputed byHershenov, who argues that one cannot convincingly consider a corpse’s parts
to be uniﬁed in the sameway as those of a living organism. Indeed, he takes his argument fur-
ther to show that there is no coherent way to understand the relationship between a corpse
and its parts and so concludes that there are no corpses. In this section I shall, following a
line pressed by LaPorte, respond to Hershenov, showing that the idea of a corpse is not the
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conceptual mess which he takes it to be.
I have above suggested that we might develop a single uniform account of the composi-
tional unity of both a living organism and its corpse. Hershenov develops a range of objec-
tions to this idea, intended to suggest that our intuitions about the parts a corpse might have,
unlike those relating to living organisms, lack any true theoretical unity. Given this, he sug-
gests that we abandon the notion of a corpse entirely, taking there to be no such things. This
argument is made through consideration of two ways in which a corpse is more dependent
upon its parts than is a living organism, highlighted in the following two quotations:
While people do not think anything strange about a living body replacing its mat-
ter or adding to it, most are very reluctant to admit that a dead body can survive
the replacement of its maĴer or can double its size (2005, p. 51)
Moreover, if the organism existed three weeks after fertilization without most of
those organs, tissues and skeleton,why are they necessary to the persistence of the
dead organism? It is the life processes that are important, not the structures that
at one time make them possible. And surely those structures cannot be important
to one’s identity if they no longer even possess the capacity to support a revived
organism (ibid, p. 54–55)
Although Hershenov presents these as two separate ‘symmetry’ arguments, each of which
shows that the proponent of our approach is commiĴed to ascribing disjunctive persistence
conditions to the entities which at one time are living but later persist as corpses (stating that
it is central to their survival that they retain their parts whilst they are alive but notwhilst they
are dead), we may fruitfully consider the second quotation to simply illustrate a particular
comparison in the context of which it seems particularly strange to consider a corpse to be
unable to change its parts. It convincingly illustrates that one cannot unify the persistence
conditions of corpses and living organisms by requiring them to maintain a constant internal
structure (since an organism might change its structural organisation as it develops) or even
the capacity to support life-processes (since a corpse rapidly decays to a point at which it can
no longer be resurrected). Given this, how canwedeny that corpses persist in a fundamentally
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diﬀerent manner than living organisms (being much more rigidly tied to their parts) and so
avoid ascibing to them disjunctive persistence conditions?
In response to this, we might take the lead from a response by LaPorte, in which he sug-
gests that Hershenov fails to account for the importance of the fact that corpsesmay no longer
assimilate new material. LaPorte observes that it is plausible to think that no body, whether
alive or dead, might incorporate new maĴer except by assimilating it (2009, p. 797). Once
we have noted this general condition upon an organism’s part-whole relationship, and recog-
nised also that most of an organism’s maĴer is assimilated through coming to be engaged
in its biological activity, there remains liĴle mystery to the suggestion that a corpse is much
less able than a living organism to change its material constitution; this simply follows from
the fact that its ability to assimilate new maĴer is markedly reduced. In this, LaPorte follows
the thought which I have above identiﬁed in Ayers that we might think the conditions under
which some maĴer remains part of an entity to be far less restrictive than those under which
it initially comes to be part of that thing. LaPorte’s account of a living organism’s ability to
change its internal structure is, I think, much less developed. Here he states only that an or-
ganismmust maintainmuch of the structure which it has upon the point of its death (ibid, pp.
799–800). This, however, does not explainwhy the organism’s existencemight be tied to those
features upon its death but not whilst it is still alive. Thus, LaPorte’s reply fails to respond
fully to Hershenov’s claim that one must, in order to support our intuitive judgements about
the persistence of corpses and of living beings, ascribe to them very diﬀerent persistence con-
ditions. Before considering Hershenov’s replies to LaPorte’s critique, I shall therefore draw
out a more pleasing response from the views I have presented above.
I above stated that we might consider an organism’s body to be focally arranged around
those aspects of its internal structure which (ordinarily) coordinate its life processes, and con-
sequently play a particularly central role in its life. An organism remains in existence,whether
alive or dead, if it maintains those aspects of its internal structure, and ceases to exist if they
become suﬃciently damaged.8 This is, I suggested, a common constraint upon the persistence
8I above glossed over an account of what it takes for an organism’s core tissues to be ‘suﬃciently damaged’ to
destroy it. It strikesme that onemightwell simply tie the organism’s continued existence to that of the tissues around
which it is focally organised, at least if one recognises that they need not continue to be able to sustain an organism’s
life in order to remain in existence (either while the organism remains alive or after it has died). Whilst I am unable
to give a ﬂeshed out account of the conditions under which we should think these tissues to be destroyed, I suspect
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of both living and dead organisms. A living organism, however, has the capacity to signiﬁ-
cantly alter its internal structure. Thus, for example, as a fetus develops, its structure becomes
increasingly complex, developing a series of organs which regulate its internal environment
and a nervous system towhich those organs are subordinated. In so doing, it becomes increas-
ingly dependent for its continued existence upon a small number of its tissues. This capacity
to alter its internal organisation, even to the point of excising and replacing faulty cellular
structures, explains why a living organismmight be more able to survive changes to its struc-
ture than a corpse. It also rests upon general principles, applicable to both living and dead
organisms. Thus, I take it, Hershenov’s criticism falls short; a corpse must sustain its internal
structure in order to remain in existence for much the same reason as a living organism can-
not survive the rapid replacement of many of its organs – its existence is tied closely to the
organised tissue structure which, if functioning correctly, plays a central role in coordinating
its life processes.
From the above, I conclude that there is liĴle reason to think that a corpse stands in a
diﬀerent relationship to its parts than does a living being. Rather, each entity must retain a
great amount of its structure in order to exist. The diﬀerence between these entities can be
wholly explained by the fact that the life processes of a living organism allow it to assimilate
newmaterial and to alter the manner in which its parts are organised. In contrast, once dead,
an organism loses the ability to do this, and so its existence becomes much more rigidly tied
to the physical structures which it had upon its death. In response to this, Hershenov notes
that “most people think dead bodies produce new parts posthumously through bloat, decay and isolated
cellular activity” (2009, p. 805). To this, he adds the observation that we might reconstruct one
and the same corpse after an autopsy, sewing its parts back together. This, Hershenov claims,
provides further evidence in favour of the complaint that corpses are governed bywholly dif-
ferent part-whole relations (and hence persistence conditions) than are living entities. These
diﬀerences, he argues, represent “unprincipled limitations” upon the ways in which a dead
body might gain new parts (it is, one might think, inexplicable why a corpse may gain a new
that there is liĴle need for me to do so; it is, I suspect, generally quite evident at what point the coherence of an organ
breaks down through decomposition. Cases in which pieces are cut oﬀ a coherent tissue structure are more diﬃcult
to deal with but, I think, this simply connects with a general diﬃculty, with which I shall not deal here, associated
with any account of the persistence of macroscopic objects.
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part through decomposition but not by having a replacement of one of its old parts sewed
onto it). If Hershenov is correct, we should therefore recognise that our view of a corpse’s
compositional unity reﬂects a gerrymandered collection of folk intuitions, which we should
ultimately dismiss.
In response to Hershenov’s point, I should begin by stating that I am inclined to say very
similar things about living organisms as about corpses. If my tissues begin to saponify or
to bloat, I see no reason why we should think the resulting products are not part of me. I
am simply an organism whose tissues are degrading whilst I remain alive. This, for example,
seems to me to be the most appealing treatment of gangrenous or necrotic tissues in the body.
Similarly, if I lose a large chunk of ﬂesh in an accident but, thinking quickly, a surgeon sews it
back ontome, so as to keepme frombleeding out before I can receive propermedical aĴention,
it strikes me that the chunk of ﬂesh would remain part of me, even if the operation left it
somewhat dissociated from my life processes (and, indeed, in the course of dying rapidly).
At any rate, it is unclear to me that any other judgement strikes us as intuitive here. Thus, it
is far from evident that intuition does tell us that corpses and living organisms have diﬀerent
part-whole relations from one another. Even if these pre-theoretic intuitions need revision
to give a more uniﬁed account of what it takes for something to become (or resume being)
part of a living organism, liĴle prevents us from similarly revising our views of dead bodies.
Hershenov’s response to LaPortemakesmuch of the fact that people ordinarily judge corpses
to be able to lose and gain parts in certain kinds of changes, the restrictions on which are, he
thinks, unmotivated. If people ordinarily think the same to be true of living bodies (as I have
suggested they do), then it would appear that we do not have a contrast between living and
dead bodies which diﬀerentiates the compositional unity of the former from that of the laĴer.
Hence, I suggest, we should leave Hershenov’s argument to the side. Corpses neither have
disjunctive persistence conditions nor signiﬁcantly diﬀerent means of acquiring and losing
parts than do living organisms. There are no signiﬁcant compositional diﬀerences between
these two types of entity.
To conclude then, I have above considered the charge that one cannot build a uniform
account of both living organisms and their corpses and suggested that it is misguided. A
corpse may gain and lose material in exactly the same manner as may a living organism (i.e.
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through assimilation, reaĴachment and degradation of its existing parts). Thus, it has exactly
the same persistence conditions as does the animal which it once was (each must, in order to
remain in existence, maintain a signiﬁcant amount of its organic structure). The only diﬀer-
ence of note between these entities is that a living organism is more able to assimilate new
material than is a dead one. As a result, an organism might, in the course of its development,
alter the organisation of its tissues, changing the systemswhich regulate its key life processes.
By doing this, it, unlike a corpse, might change the tissues upon which it most relies for its
existence. This, however, does not reﬂect a diﬀerence between the persistence conditions as-
sociated with each entity but rather simply reveals the importance of life for an account of an
organism’s (and hence also a corpse’s) compositional structure. In virtue of this, I take it that
we may ignore the brunt of Hershenov’s criticism of the notion of a corpse.
3.3.3 Life as a Key Individuating Factor
I hope above to have suggested that we can coherently extend our recognition of living or-
ganisms so as to identify them after their deaths. There is, I think, absolutely no incoherence
in this suggestion. Nevertheless, one might still ﬁnd it problematic, asking what positive rea-
son we have for taking it seriously. Given the close conceptual connection between biological
organisms and their lives, why should we not take the end of life to also be the end of the
biological organism? In this section, I wish to brieﬂy consider and dismiss this suggestion,
ﬁlled out by reference to the considerations that earlier led us to claim that dead organisms
are not even bad exemplars of any biological kind.
To sharpen this objection, we should reconsider the following observation of Olson’s:
The changes that go on in an animal when it dies are really quite dramatic. All of
that frenetic, highly organized, and extremely complex biochemical activity that
was going on throughout the organism comes to a rather sudden end, and the
chemical machinery begins immediately to decay. If it looks like there is not all
that much diﬀerence between a living animal and a fresh corpse, that is because
the most striking changes take place at the microscopic level and below. (1997, p.
151)
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Here, Olson notes that there is a dramatic diﬀerence between dead and living organisms.
Whilst maĴer ‘ﬂows’ through the former, the laĴer merely awaits a long, slow process of
decomposition. Given the relative violence of death, it seems to provide a much less arbitrary
cut-oﬀ for the organism’s life than does any later point in its decay. Since we must, when
death and subsequent decay occurs, think that the organism involved ceases to exist at some
point in time, why not identify this with the most obvious change in its characteristics – its
death? To strengthen this criticism,wemight also add to it the following comment ofWiggins,
also crucial to the case we made above:
But thewhole distinction [between a living organismand its remainswhendecom-
position has destroyed it] is parasitic upon the point of distinguishing between life
anddeath.Merematerial continuity is not suﬃcient. And if life or its absence gives
the point of these distinctions, then the principal distinction is between being live
and being dead, and the best overall view will make existence or non-existence
depend upon the principal distinction. (1976, p. 143)
Wigginsmakes a point here which is subtle andworthy of close aĴention. In essence, he notes
that we, in claiming that an organism’s corpse must retain certain aspects of its structure in
order to remain in existence, have recognised that life has a special ontological signiﬁcance,
central to our individuation of things that have, at one time or another, been organisms. Given
that we must appeal to an organism’s life in order to determine whether or not a corpse re-
mains in existence after it has been cut into pieces, there is some pressure upon us to consider
life to have even more signiﬁcance than this, being necessary for any organism’s continued
existence.Why shouldwe draw back from this in developing our ﬁnal view of the persistence
conditions of living organisms?
My answer to this shall be very brief and, for the most part consist in a recapitulation of
what has been said above. It is natural to think that organisms, just like fountains (an example
favoured by Olson), are made of maĴer structured in such a way as to sustain a speciﬁc type
of activity. As we noted above, an organism’s remains do not instantly lose their structure or
dissipate when it dies; rather, they remain in existence and gradually degrade. Given this, we
must say something about what seems (to the naked eye at least) to be a coherent, structured
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mass of maĴer (or alternatively, deny that all physically coherent structures are individual
entities – a suggestion with radical ontological consequences). Whilst a corpse’s lack of bio-
logical activity might easily justify us in refraining from considering it to be an organism, the
changes which it undergoes (since they do not destroy its material body) are insuﬃciently
dramatic to motivate the claim that no corpses exist, even supposing that sense can be made
of this claim. I have aĴempted to show above that a coherent account can be given of corpses
which draws inspiration from what, in any event, we must say about living organisms (and,
in doing so, avoids the worries I raised for accounts which take corpses to be ontologically
very diﬀerent from living organisms). Given their signiﬁcant structural similarities to living
organisms, why should we withdraw from holding that a living organism’s remains, rather
like the ice in a frozen fountain, constitute the very same object as once existed, living and
breathing, for so long as they retain enough of its structure? Whatever pressure there is to
suppose that an organism ceases to exist upon its death, this must be weighed against the
awkwardness of giving an alternative account of the material object which remains after an
organism dies – its corpse. I suspect that, on balance, it is most appealing to think that an or-
ganism might outlast its death and therefore reject Wiggins’ and Olson’s suggestion that we
should take an organism’s continued existence to depend upon the application to it of the
principal distinction between living entities and all other things.
3.4 Summary
Given that something cannot remain an organism after its death, should we also consider
death to remove it from the face of the earth? This view, known as the ‘termination thesis’,
faces the special problem of accounting for corpses.What are they, if not the organismswhich
existed just a shortwhile ago? I have here argued, taking heed of a suggestion fromAyers, that
we should not distinguish a corpse from the living organismwhich it once was; the structural
continuities between these two things are too great for us to think that one is not the other.
This, I have suggested, does not deprive us of a principled (and intuitively appealing) way of
answering questions aboutwhat happens to a corpse over awide range of circumstances. Nor,
I claimed, does it necessitate that we accept a disjunctive view of an organism’s persistence.
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I promised before that I should be able to formulate more fully the view which I here defend
at the end of our discussion. This view, we might now summarise by means of the following
principles:
Assimilation: Anorganismmight gain newparts through a variety of processes.Most saliently,
newparticles becomepart of it through being absorbed into its body and caught up in its
life-processes. However, onemight alsowish to hold that an organismmight increase in
size through the reaĴachment of what was once a part of it or through the degradation
of its tissues.
Retention: Anything which is among an organism’s parts need only remain rigidly aĴached
to it (or contained within it) in order to remain part of it. It need not, for example, con-
tinue to be caught up in its life processes (as evidenced by the fact that horns, hairs
and necrotic tissues remain among an organism’s parts despite being excluded from its
biological activities).
Structural Persistence: In order for an organism (or a corpse) to remain in existence, it must
retain those aspects of its physical structure around which it is focally organised. These
parts need not retain the capacity to sustain its life in order to remain in existence (and
so underwrite the organism’s continued existence).
Not only do these principles apply equally both to living and to dead entities (giving theoret-
ical support to many judgements which I take to be intuitive), they also strike me to provide
the best overall view of the persistence conditions of an organism, allowing us to distinguish
the continuation of its life (which requires it to retain a signiﬁcant amount of its internal struc-
ture) from that of life processes which once belonged to it (occurring, for example, in tissues
removed from it and kept alive). Thus, I conclude that we should believe that animals con-
tinue to exist after their deaths, albeit as things which are no longer organisms.
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Cѕюѝѡђџ 4
Derivative Existents
We began this thesis with the thought that wemust, in order to explain how any object’s iden-
tity is ﬁxed, reference a characterising sort. This allows us to do two things. First, such charac-
terisations allow us to determinately ascribe properties to their objects and to make sense of
the constraints which we intuitively recognise upon the coinstantiation of various properties.
This may lead us to discover constraints upon the cardinality of any domain beyond those
which follow from the logical properties of the identity predicate. Secondly, sorts play a privi-
leged role in determining the types of changes which an individual continuant might endure
without ceasing to exist. In virtue of this, they determine the temporal extent of their careers.
It is, I think, extremely appealing to take sorts to play both of these individuative roles. How-
ever, elaborating further upon this schematic outline of a theory of individuation is a task of
substantive metaphysics (and a diﬃcult one at that). This thesis has presented a case against
one interpretation of the notion that sorts characterise objects and, in doing so, determine
which additional features (relevant to their implementation) are to set them apart from all
other things. The sortal instantiation thesis claims that an object’s existence is grounded in its
implementation of its characterising sort. This, I suggested at the end of the ﬁrst chapter of
this thesis, obliges us to state that an object must, at any time at which it exists, instantiate the
kind which (at that time) characterises it. It is this consequence which I have here argued to
be false, thus motivating the rejection of the sortal instantiation thesis.
Our rejection of the sortal instantiation thesis stems from an examination of living organ-
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isms, and of the changes which they might undergo before they ﬁnally cease to exist. It is,
I have suggested, impossible to properly individuate living organisms (and to track them
through the various changes which they might undergo in the course of their existence) with-
out making some reference to their biological activities. Not only are such activities charac-
teristic of living organisms, they must often be referenced in order to determine just what
material structure an animal has (and hence to make sense of its individuality). Hence, I ar-
gued, we should not consider a corpse to be an instance of the same kind as a living organism.
Nevertheless, it has been crucial to our account of an organism’s corpse that it has much the
same persistence conditions (and internal organisation) as a living organism. Therefore, I con-
clude, it remains characterised by the sort юћіњюљ despite no longer falling under it.
Unless one develops an alternative account of the types of thingswhich corpses are (and of
the changes which they might undergo) or claims that no such objects exist, one must there-
fore reject the sortal instantiation thesis. The laĴer of these options is, I think, unpalatable,
and has mainly been motivated by the claim that no principled account can be given of the
persistence conditions of corpses. Against this option, I hope to have presented a theoretically
uniﬁed (and intuitively plausible) account of the persistence of corpses, based entirely upon
an account that we must, in any case, apply to the persistence of living organisms (at least if
we are to capture the intuitive thought that an organism may, at many points in its existence,
have a number of parts which are not caught up in low-level biological activity). I therefore
take this option to be extremely unpalatable. Equally, given the centrality of an organism’s
life to its individuation, I doubt very much that any satisfactory alternative account of the
nature of dead organisms can be devised. Hence, I submit, corpses are individuated by refer-
ence to a kind of which they are no longer an instance (and by features which they once bore).
We must therefore reject the sortal instantiation thesis, claiming that it introduces constraints
upon the changes which entities might undergo where there are, in fact, none.
Not only does is the above argument compatible with the core grain of truth in the sor-
tal instantiation thesis – the claim that objects are characterised (and hence individuated) by
reference to kinds – it, in fact, relies upon this thought in its account of the nature of corpses.
Hence, it strikes me that we lose nothing of individuative signiﬁcance by rejecting the sortal
instantiation thesis, and moving to a less restrictive account of identity. With this in place,
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I hope now to brieﬂy outline some advantages of accepting an ontological account which
recognises both paradigmatic cases of individuation (in which an object exempliﬁes its char-
acterising sort) and derivative cases (in which it does not).
4.1 The Ontological Application of Uninstantiated Characterising Sorts
One might, I fear, respond dismissively to the above by distinguishing weaker and stronger
senses in which an object might instantiate a kind property (or, alternatively, by counting all
individuals individuated by reference to the kind юћіњюљ asmembers of another, more exten-
sive characterising kind). In what follows, I therefore hope to show that there are strong the-
oretical reasons to maintain that the sortal instantiation thesis is false, and so that organisms
might be characterised (and hence individuated) by kinds under which they no longer fall.
First, as mentioned above, it seems intuitive to think that there is a sense in which corpses
are not well-individuated. Such objects seem to be individuated primarily by reference to
phases of their existence which have now ended. This, I think, suggests that we should think
there to be a key individuative diﬀerence between living and dead organisms, captured by
the suggestion that the laĴer aremerely ‘derivative’ individuals, associatedwith a kind under
which they no longer fall. The acceptance of such derivative existents, I suggest, reveals to us
both how we might draw together two apparently contrasting perspectives upon individu-
ation and also provides us with an inviting context within which to consider the possibility
of substantial change. Hence, I suggest, there is great theoretical advantage to holding that
objects may be characterised by kinds to which they no longer belong (and correspondingly
to distinguishing ‘derivative’ from ‘paradigmatic’ individuals).
4.1.1 Derivative Existence
To begin, we shall revisit the point submiĴed above, that one must, in order to know what
it would take for a corpse to remain in existence (and sometimes even to distinguish it from
other corpses or from living organisms to which it is aĴached), look back to the life which
it no longer leads. This is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ordinary case of individuation, in
which an object’s internal characteristics (derived from the kind to which it belongs) may
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easily suﬃce by themselves to individuate it. In this sense, then, the individuation of dead
bodies is dependent upon characteristics which are presently external to them. This alone
reveals to us that one cannot explicate the individuative role of a sort in isolation from the
features which are characteristic of the entities which fall under it – a consideration which
mitigates against the weaker reading of property instantiation suggested above.
The above has a further philosophical upshot. It is common to think that each individual
substance contains within itself the grounds for its individuality (and hence for its diﬀerentia-
tion from every other thing) – this at least seems a natural interpretation of the claim that ma-
terial substances are “the only logically independent individuals possessing independent existence”
(Ayers 1991b, p. 70). From our discussion of corpses, however, it follows that there exist some
objects whose individuation is dependent upon properties which do not, at the time of their
individuation, belong to them. These we might call ‘derivative objects’ as their introduction
into our ontology is parasitic on the possibility of singling out other things (the paradigmatic
members of their individuative kinds) which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from them. This is,
of course, not a new conclusion. Aristotle illustrates the very same thought in the following
paragraph, in which he considers what happens to a living organism’s functional parts once
they are removed from it:
What a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when
it can perform its function; an eye, for instance, when it can see. When a thing
cannot do so it is that thing only in name, like a dead eye or one made of stone
(390a10–12)
The above, however, extends Aristotle’s discussion by revealing that there might exist deriva-
tive objects whose existence is less obviously dependent upon other objects than is an organ’s;
a corpse, for example, seems to be an individual substance which simply lacks the life as-
sociated with its living counterpart. Indeed, further, our suggestion that living organisms
sometimes endure their deaths might be taken to show that substances may become less well
individuated than they previously were as a result of undergoing change. Such entities’ per-
sistence conditions become, I argued, determined by considerations which are, in a very real
sense, external to them. This is, I think, an interesting and worthwhile ontological conclusion
74
4.1. The Ontological Application of Uninstantiated Characterising Sorts
to investigate (although I shall not do so here), especially insofar as it allows us to recognise
objects intermediate between mere aggregations of maĴer and full-blooded individual con-
tinuants and hence to do justice to the intuitive thought that an object’s destruction (and the
associated breakdown in its individuality) might be gradual, allowing it to ‘fade’ out of exis-
tence as its characteristics become further and further removed from those of the thing which
it once was (and it consequently becomes less and less easily individuated by its characteris-
ing sort).
Our rejection of the sortal instantiation thesis thus leads us immediately to distinguish
from one another various ways in which an object can be individuated. Interestingly, it sug-
gests that there exist mind-independent objects which are not individuated or characterised
by the way that they in fact are, but rather by a template which exists in nature and applies to
them only in an aĴenuated manner. Not only will this have signiﬁcance for the two debates
yet to be presented, it also seems tome towarrant close aĴention on its ownmerits. I therefore
submit that we would do well to mark the distinction between derivative and paradigmatic
individuals in our theories of individuation.
4.1.2 Processive and Compositional Substance Ontologies
Another interesting topic, bordering on our discussion above, concerns diﬀerent views of the
nature of entities, and consequently of the features which individuate them. Here, we may
usefully introduce two diﬀerent views. Those with particular interests in living entities and
the philosophy of biology are often inclined to think that the signiﬁcant distinction between
‘mere’ local aggregates of material and individual substances rests in the fact that the laĴer
engage in a distinctive kind of self-organising activity, fromwhich results their characteristic
physical structure and paĴerns of growth. To the proponents of this approach, one’s eﬀorts to
individuate objects must be directed towards understanding the distinctive kinds of activity
which ground their existence. In contrast, to the proponent of an alternative ‘compositional’
view, an object’s activity is of liĴle ontological signiﬁcance; its material structure and propen-
sity to cohere in the face of outside interference (as well as the fact that it spatially excludes all
other objects) is already suﬃciently impressive to determinately ﬁx its identity. On this view,
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the processive ontology suﬀers from two principal defects. First, it may often be unclear how
it could distinguish individual objects from one another; processes are not, one might think,
internallywell-individuated continuants but rather secondary entities, dependent for their ex-
istence upon their participants – individual substances whose existence is ontologically prior
to their activities. Second, and relatedly, this view suﬀers from a type of ontological snobbery,
being unable to say very much about entities whose existence is less clearly caught up with
any capacities for self-directed activity, such as stones and mountains. Consequently, it fails
properly to identify the persistence conditions of ordinarymaterial objects which, due to their
foundational ontological role (ignored entirely by the processive view), might survive many
changes in the processes in which they are engaged and yet continue to play an active causal
role in the world.
The above discussion, I hope, highlights the excesses of each view. Even self-organising
life-processes are, I hope to have suggested, insuﬃciently well individuated to be tied closely
to the existence of individual organisms without further reference to the material structures
caught up in them. Further, it seems to me that the fact that substances are associated with
such structures does play a crucial role in our intuition that they are the source of stable (and
uniﬁed) causal powers which have a great impact upon happenings in the world. At the same
time though, I have argued that it is impossible to, metaphysically speaking, get any insight
into how an object’s physical structure might sustain its identity (or even into that structure’s
composition) unless we look into the connections between that structure and the object’s typi-
cal mode of activity.1 Further, it seems tome that onemightward oﬀ the charge of ontological
snobbery by accepting that objectsmight sometimes be individuated by reference to processes
in which they no longer engage. Although I shall not develop this suspicion here, it seems
to me likely that one might sometimes individuate inanimate objects by reference to the pro-
cesses by which objects of their kinds are typically formed, taking their persistence to stem
from their subsequent maintenance of the physical structures with which they initially came
into being. I hence conclude that processive and compositional perspectives upon material
1Indeed, even though I liberally made reference above to the tissues around which an organism is organised
without fully describing how they might be individuated, I should point out here, in line with the materials devel-
oped in the last chapter, that may often be the activities (and causal histories) of an organism’s parts, rather than
their physical conﬁguration, which determines whether they compose one or many such systems.
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substances must interact if either is ever to oﬀer us an informative individuative perspective.
Under this approach, these perspectives emerge not as competing accounts of individuation
but rather as interdependent elements of a single ontological view.
I above suggested that material substances must sometimes be individuated by reference
to activities in which they do not engage. This thought accepts that an object’s structural fea-
tures cannot, in isolation from its activities, individuate it. Indeed, more crucially, it suggests
that wemay gain no insight into the metaphysically signiﬁcant aspects of an entity’s physical
structure without reference to some such activities or processes. However, it does not follow
from this that we may individuate material substances without reference to their material
structure; the processive view cannot give a satisfactory perspective upon an entity’s persis-
tence unless it incorporates the compositionalist’s concern with material structure. By ﬁrmly
distinguishing between the conditions under which a sort is instantiated and those in which
it may individuate objects, the ideas presented above give clarity to the suggestion that we
should reject the contrast between compositional and processive ontologies and insteadmake
use of the strengths of each.
4.1.3 Substantial Change
A ﬁnal popular thesis which borders on our discussion is the claim that each object must,
whenever it exists, be individuated by a single substance sortal. On this view, an object’s char-
acterising kind cannot change at any point in its existence, even if it may cease to instantiate
it. Nothing I have said above counts against this claim. Nevertheless, I hope to suggest be-
low that we may, once we’ve accepted that there might exist objects which are individuated
in a derivative manner, more easily see a way around this thesis than we might otherwise.
Hence, yet again, I submit that maintaining a clear distinction between a sort’s individuative
role and its instantiation enables us a perspective upon ontological discussions which might
otherwise be ignored.
The claim that no object can change its individuative sort might be backed up by the sug-
gestion that one could not have good grounds for considering a single entity to exist both
before and after a change which altered entirely its criteria of identity. Those aĴempting to
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conceive of such change seem, at ﬁrst, to be faced wth a dilemma. First, if we conceive of
substantial change along the lines of ordinary alterations to an object’s properties, in which
one sortal ceases to individuate an entity and is instantly replaced by another, then (even if
the point at which this change occurs is metaphysically indeterminate) it is unclear why we
should consider objects to be able to change in kind; on this view, an object’s persistence con-
ditions (and the activities which individuate it – by reference to which one might ordinarily
seek to resolve questions about its identity) alter instantaneously, leaving us with few ma-
terials by which to stave oﬀ the suggestion that this involves the rapid replacement of one
entity by another of a diﬀerent kind. The prospects for the alternative claim that a single ob-
ject might simultaneously fall under more than one individuative sort, however, seem to be
only slightly less dim; such a viewwould ascribe to a single object the metaphysical structure
associated with more than one type of activity and, in light of this, may often be unable to
adjudicate between competing judgements about what happens to that object when it under-
goes a given change (such aswhen it loses the structures associatedwith the sort underwhich
it initially came into existence). To avoid this laĴer claim, one must think that neither object’s
sort fully determines its persistence conditions, and so ﬁnd it “lacking a principle of identity and
persistence made fully determinate …by a [single] sortal concept” (Wiggins 2001, p. 67) – a possi-
bility which might initially be thought to call into question our claim that each object can be
given a metaphysically privileged characterisation which, by itself, ﬁxes its identity.
The above ideas, however, allow us to accommodate the possibility of substantial change
without denying that an object’s persistence conditions are solely determined by its character-
ising sort. We have above elaborated upon the thought that an object might survive a change
which causes its kind-characteristic activity to come to an end and suggested that such an
object ceases to be entirely well-individuated – its individuality is, we have said, supported
by features which it does not at that time bear. In light of this, we might take substantial
changes to comprise an intermediate stage in which the object involved falls under no sort
determinately but instead must at once be considered (due to its structural features, and the
changes which it undergoes) to be an ex-member of one kind and an emergingmember of an-
other; its characterisation should hence be thought to explicitly reference the fact that it is in a
transitional state. On this picture, then, individuative responsibilitymight be gradually ‘trans-
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ferred’ between the kinds under which an object falls, both allowing it to survive substantial
change and accommodating our intuition that it becomes, in someway, entirely unclear what
it is that we have before us (or even whether we do, in fact, have a single well-individuated
entity) as an object undergoesmetamorphosis. This allows us tomaintain that an object’s gen-
erative kind does, at least in ordinary circumstances, give it entirely determinate persistence
conditions whilst maintaining that one might sometimes keep sight of a single entity as it
undergoes a change in kind – thus avoiding Wiggins’ worries about substantial change.
We do not often speak as though substantial change is possible. Nevertheless, it is, I think,
interesting to question why this is the case. I doubt very much that the response will be the
Wigginsian claim that it is simply impossible to consider an entity’s identity to be sustained
through an alteration to the activities and features characteristic of it. Further, I suspect that
the idea of substantial change might be of great help in considering the developmental pro-
cesses of entities which undergo signiﬁcant change between diﬀerent ‘stages’ of their lives,
especially when (as with buĴerﬂies) this involves an intermediary stage in which an organ-
ism’s structure is radically rearranged or (like coral) the diﬀerences between the beginning
and end stages of an organism’s life are so great as to rule out the possibility that they have
any capacities or behavioural activities in common. The ideas presented above further seem
well-placed to accommodate the intuition that an entity’s individuality might be, to some ex-
tent, compromised by metamorphosis. Rejecting the claim that an object must, at every time,
fall under its characterising sort helps us get these arguments in view, and thus should strike
one as a useful and interesting metaphysical perspective upon identity.
4.2 Conclusion
In the above, I have presented and argued against an overstatement of the thought that we
must, in order to determine the truth of any identity statement, characterise the object which
it concerns by referencing some kind which characterises it. Such kinds, I have suggested,
generate objects and, in virtue of doing so, ﬁx all facts about their identities. I have suggested
that its overstatement rests in the thought that an object must, whenever it exists, implement
its characterising sort. This fails to appreciate that we might track an object without diﬃculty
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even through changes which render it devoid of most of the features characteristic of the
members of that kind. In previous chapters, I developed the argument that a corpse is not
a dead animal but nevertheless remains the very same entity as the organism from which it
came in order to illustrate this point. Since onemay only develop a satisfactory understanding
of a dead animal (and hence individuate it) by reference to the life which it once led, it follows
from this that we should reject the sortal instantiation thesis.
In this chapter, I hope to have shown that our rejection of the sortal instantiation thesis
might lead us to distinguish entities which are ‘well-individuated’ from those whose exis-
tence is, in some sense, derivative – depending upon a sortal which they do not exemplify.
Not only is this claim of intrinsic philosophical interest, it also, I submit, has important theo-
retical implications. Thus, for example, we might, by accepting this suggestion, incorporate
the insights of both processive and compositional perspectives uponmaterial substances into
a single account of their individuation. Further, andmore interestingly, it begins to direct our
aĴention towards the thesis that objects might be individuated by diﬀerent sorts at diﬀerent
times in their existence. Although I suspect that we should reject this laĴer claim, I think that
it does a gross disservice to the resources of our individuative worldview (and indeed to the
complexities of nature) simply to insist, as might the proponent of the sortal instantiation
thesis, that the idea of substantial change is merely incoherent. We should, therefore, happily
reject the sortal instantiation thesis; this ontological view is, I submit, entirely ill-prepared
to cope with a variety of individuative challenges to which we frequently respond without
signiﬁcant diﬃculty.
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